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DESPITE PREEMPTION:  
MAKING LABOR LAW IN CITIES AND STATES 
Benjamin I. Sachs
∗ 
The preemption regime grounded in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is 
understood to preclude state and local innovation in the field of labor law.  Yet 
preemption doctrine has not put an end to state and local labor lawmaking.  While 
preemption has eliminated traditional forms of labor law in cities and states, it has not 
prevented state and local reconstruction of the NLRA’s rules through what this Article 
terms “tripartite lawmaking.”  The dynamic of tripartite lawmaking occurs when 
government actions in areas of law unrelated to labor — but of significant interest to 
employers — are exchanged for private agreements through which unions and employers 
reorder the rules of union organizing and bargaining.  These tripartite political 
exchanges produce organizing and bargaining rules that are markedly different from the 
ones the federal statute provides but that are nonetheless fully enforceable as a matter of 
federal law. 
By describing the phenomenon of tripartite lawmaking, this Article allows for a more 
complete understanding of the local role in contemporary labor law.  But the existence of 
tripartite lawmaking also reveals important characteristics of federal preemption more 
generally.  In particular, the potential for tripartite lawmaking within the confines of 
formally preemptive regulatory regimes points to the limits of preemption’s ability to 
allocate regulatory authority among different levels of government and deliver a uniform, 
national system of law.  State and local lawmaking that occurs through the tripartite 
dynamic also has a number of distinctive features that become visible once we recognize 
the existence of this form of lawmaking.  As this Article suggests, moreover, tripartite 
lawmaking is likely not limited to the labor context but may occur wherever federal 
preemption coexists with the possibility for private ordering. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
It would be difficult to find a regime of federal preemption broader 
than the one grounded in the National Labor Relations Act1 (NLRA).  
Although the statute contains no preemption clause, the Supreme 
Court has established a series of interlinking doctrines that are in-
tended to foreclose state and local intervention into the rules of union 
organizing and bargaining.2  Indeed, the prevailing view of contempo-
rary labor law is that although the NLRA is a failed statute, the possi-
bility for state and local innovation is choked off by one of the most 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  ∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.  For helpful comments and suggestions, 
the author thanks Anne Alstott, Gabriella Blum, Rachel Brewster, Glenn Cohen, Christine Desan, 
Cynthia Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Jerry Frug, Heather Gerken, Michael Klarman, Adriaan Lanni, 
Daryl Levinson, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Gerald Neuman, Ben Roin, Jed Shugerman, 
Matthew Stephenson, Jeannie Suk, and participants in the Harvard Law School Faculty Work-
shop.  Jaime Eagan, Philip Mayor, and David Seligman provided outstanding research assistance. 
  1  29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
  2  Simply for expositional purposes, this Article will use both “local” and “state and local” to 
refer to all levels of subnational government — including states, counties, and cities.    
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expansive preemption regimes in American law.  This conventional 
view, however, has left us with an incomplete picture of the role of the 
local in American labor law.  The problem derives from the fact that 
we have overlooked something fundamental about the nature and logic 
of preemption. 
As leading scholars in the field have shown, federal labor preemp-
tion is extraordinarily broad.3  Preemption rules have, aside from a few 
narrow exceptions,4 eliminated traditional forms of labor law in cities 
and states: there are no state statutes governing private sector union 
organizing, nor city ordinances policing labor-management relations.5  
This Article shows, however, that while preemption prevents states 
and cities from enacting labor law through traditional channels, it has 
not stopped state and local reconstruction of the federal rules through 
alternative means.  That is, rather than preventing local intervention 
into matters of central concern to the federal regime, preemption re-
channels and reshapes local efforts to intervene in matters reserved for 
federal control. 
In the model of local lawmaking identified and developed here,   
union organizing and bargaining rules are reconstructed through tri-
partite political exchanges in which state and local governments,   
unions, and employers all play indispensable roles.  In this form of 
lawmaking, which this Article terms “tripartite lawmaking” or “tripar-
tism,” governments act in areas of law that are entirely unrelated to 
labor organizing and bargaining but that are of acute interest to em-
ployers — areas ranging from medical malpractice rules, to telecom-
munications policy, to zoning and permitting decisions.  These gov-
ernmental actions, in turn, are exchanged for private contractual 
agreements through which unions and employers bind themselves to 
new rules for organizing and bargaining.  Because the NLRA affirma-
tively protects contractual reordering of this kind, the results of these 
tripartite arrangements are codes of organizing and bargaining rules 
markedly different from the ones provided for in the federal statute 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  3  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law,  102 C OLUM.  L. 
REV. 1527, 1530–31, 1569–79 (2002); Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: 
State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 Y ALE J. ON REG. 355, 374–94 (1990); see also Henry H. 
Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law Preemption Doctrine to Allow the 
States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97, 163–88 (2009). 
  4  Primary among the exceptions to preemption doctrine that apply in the private sector is the 
“market participant” or “proprietary” exception, which this Article takes up in Part II.  As noted 
below, the interventions discussed in this Article do not involve state and local governments act-
ing through the proprietary exception. 
  5  Because the NLRA exempts public employers from its coverage, states and cities are free to 
regulate public sector unionization and bargaining.  See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).  This Article, howev-
er, is concerned with unionization and labor-management relations in the private sector.    
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but nonetheless fully enforceable as a matter of federal law.6  And be-
cause local governments act in areas of law unrelated to labor, these 
departures from the federal regime are either invisible to preemption 
scrutiny or, at the least, exceptionally difficult to detect and preempt.7 
This Article provides — in as much detail as possible, given the in-
herent opacity of these arrangements — a set of examples of such tri-
partite lawmaking.  In one example, the City of New Haven, the Yale–
New Haven Hospital, and the New Haven hospital workers’ union 
engaged in three-way negotiations over the construction of a cancer fa-
cility.  The union wanted new rules for organizing.  The hospital 
needed zoning and development permits from the City.  Following a 
series of meetings mediated by the New Haven mayor, a package deal 
was reached: the City issued the permits in exchange for the hospital’s 
agreement to reorder contractually the rules of organizing.  In another 
example, the Communications Workers of America and two telecom 
firms tied new organizing rules to state approval of the companies’ 
merger.  The other examples of tripartite lawmaking offered here in-
volve the nursing home industry in California — where adoption of 
non-NLRA organizing and bargaining rules was predicated on 
changes to the state’s Medicaid reimbursement system — and the re-
newable energy sector in Pennsylvania.8 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  6  In naming this process “lawmaking” despite its partial reliance on private contractual 
agreements between unions and employers, I follow, among others, Louis Jaffe.  See Louis L. 
Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 214–15, 220–21, 234–35 (1937). 
  7  In cataloguing the various ways unions secure private agreements on organizing and bar-
gaining rules, others have noted that unions at times rely on the exercise of their state and local 
political power.  See James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition: Pros-
pects for Changing Paradigms, 90 I OWA L. REV. 819, 837–38 (2005); Estlund, supra note 3, at 
1604; Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Labor Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor Neutrality 
Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement,  22 B ERKELEY  J.  EMP.  &  LAB.  L.  369,  391 
(2001).  In the industrial relations literature, Professors Harry Katz, Rosemary Batt, and Jeffrey 
Keefe discuss the ways that the Communications Workers of America union integrates political 
and organizing strategies, including the approaches discussed below in section III.A.3.  See Harry 
C. Katz, Rosemary Batt & Jeffrey H. Keefe, The Revitalization of the CWA: Integrating Collective 
Bargaining, Political Action, and Organizing, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 573 (2003).  While 
Professor Roger Hartley discusses the relationship between private agreements and preemption, 
his investigation is limited to the question “of whether labor law preempts a decision by a state or 
local government to require a neutrality agreement from a private business wishing to enter into a 
business relationship with the governmental entity.”  Hartley, supra, at 405; see also Estlund, su-
pra note 3, at 1604 (noting that “states and municipalities, when acting in their ‘proprietary’ ca-
pacity, have wide latitude to impose conditions on [state and municipal] contractors in the interest 
of labor peace”).  As noted, and as explained below in greater detail, these actions are not the 
types of state and local intervention at issue here. 
  8  The author of this Article worked in the legal department of the Service Employees Interna-
tional Union — the parent of the union locals involved in the New Haven cancer center agree-
ment and the California nursing home agreement — from 2002 to 2006.  The discussion of these 
agreements in this Article is based exclusively on information from public sources.  See sections 
III.A.1–2, pp. 1174–87.    
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Tripartite labor lawmaking does not involve states and cities acting 
through the few remaining exceptions to the NLRA’s broad preemp-
tion doctrine.  These are not, for example, instances in which states 
and cities shape the labor practices of their own contractors, nor are 
they instances in which labor standards are incorporated into local 
procurement, investment, or financing policies.9  Nor do these inter-
ventions constitute tinkering at the edges of labor law.  To the con-
trary, the interventions described here achieve on a local scale precisely 
the elements of labor law reform that labor scholars and the labor 
movement have long sought, but failed to achieve, at the national lev-
el: card check recognition, limits on employer involvement in union 
campaigns, union access to employer property, and more effective en-
forcement of the duty to bargain.10 
By providing a new and more accurate description of the way 
NLRA preemption operates, this Article thus allows us to understand 
better the role of the local in contemporary labor law.  But the exis-
tence of tripartite lawmaking also reveals important characteristics of 
preemption itself. 
At the most basic level, tripartite lawmaking presents significant 
difficulties for doctrinal preemption analysis.  Preemption analysis re-
quires courts to compare a challenged state or local action with the po-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  9  That is, these are not instances in which states and localities act in their proprietary capaci-
ty.  This exception to the general preemption doctrine is discussed below.  See  infra p. 1168.  
States and cities are indeed acting through the proprietary exception, and in significant ways.  
See, e.g., Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Res., LLC, 390 F.3d 
206,  218 ( 3d Cir. 2004).  Local governments are also acting through other exceptions to the 
preemption rules.  For example, when a group of workers does not fall within the NLRA’s defini-
tion of “employee,” see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), local governments are free to enact labor laws for these 
workers.  In areas including home care and child care work, states are engaged in innovative ex-
periments of this sort.  See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Labor Law Renewal, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 375, 382–87 (2007); Peggie R. Smith, The Publicization of Home-Based Care Work in State 
Labor Law,  92 M INN.  L.  REV.  1390 ( 2008).  These forms of state and local intervention are 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
  10  This fact, among others, distinguishes the interventions described here from recent attempts 
to use state and local zoning and development procedures to exclude disfavored employers from a 
particular jurisdiction because of the employers’ labor practices.  See Catherine L. Fisk & Mi-
chael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. 
REV. 1502 (2008).  In their study of efforts to reform Wal-Mart’s labor practices, Professors Cath-
erine Fisk and Michael Oswalt contend that workers’ rights advocates have turned away from 
unionization and toward exclusionary zoning rules and “fair share” health care legislation.  See id.  
at  1503.  They argue that “the strategies that would enable worker advocates to challenge   
Wal-Mart’s labor practices most directly are largely foreclosed by inadequate federal protection  
of the right to unionize,” id. at 1507, and that “[f]ederal preemption compounds the problem  
by preventing localities and states from enacting laws intended to facilitate unionization,” id. at 
1507 n.20.  See also id. at 1511 (“[A]venues to improve low-wage jobs and benefits through union-
ization . . . [are] foreclosed by preemption.”).  Fisk and Oswalt’s conclusion that preemption has 
prevented states and localities from intervening to rectify these shortcomings is a conclusion this 
Article contests.    
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tentially relevant federal law.  But when the state or local action takes 
place in an area of law removed from the one governed by the federal 
statute — as it does in tripartite lawmaking — preemption review will 
often be impossible.11  As such, tripartism limits preemption’s ability 
to allocate regulatory authority among different levels of government 
and ensure a uniform, national system of law. 
By frustrating traditional preemption scrutiny, moreover, tripartite 
lawmaking enables local departures from a formally preemptive feder-
al statute.  Accordingly, the normative desirability of the preemption 
regime cannot be judged — as it historically has been — simply by 
asking whether a uniform national policy is superior to a regime de-
fined by state and local variation.  A complete normative assessment 
of the preemption regime requires that we take account of tripartite 
lawmaking — that we consider both the type of local variation that 
tripartism enables and the legal and political processes through which 
tripartite law is made. 
The implications that emerge are mixed.  In the labor context, the 
fact that tripartite lawmaking allows for some substantive departures 
from the formally preemptive federal rules means that tripartism 
enables states and cities to respond to the NLRA’s central pathologies.  
Thus, while NLRA rules do not adequately protect employee choice on 
the question of unionization,12 tripartite labor lawmaking produces po-
tential solutions: a rebalancing of speech rights for employees and or-
ganizers, restrictions on the form and content of employer intervention 
in union campaigns, and reconstructed mechanisms for employee deci-
sionmaking.  While the NLRA bargaining regime seems unable to fa-
cilitate agreement, tripartite lawmaking produces alternative ap-
proaches that might hold greater promise.13  Aside from these substan-
tive considerations, variation per se can be beneficial.  Consistent with 
models of “learning by variation” and experimentalism, the reordered 
rules of organizing and bargaining that emerge from tripartism pro-
vide us with data with which we could improve the federal design. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  11  Part V explores whether labor preemption doctrine might be expanded, or enforced more 
robustly, to capture and invalidate tripartite labor lawmaking. 
  12  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 305, 349–53 (1994); Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to 
the Rules of Union Organizing,  123 H ARV.  L.  REV.  655,  720–27 ( 2010).  See generally Mark   
Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic 
to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753 (1994). 
  13  See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk & Adam R. Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee 
Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47, 55–65 (2009).  Employers critique other components of the 
federal regime, for example section 8(a)(2)’s prohibition of many forms of (nonunion) labor-
management committees.  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 1544–51.  As noted immediately be-
low, however, tripartism has provided a mechanism through which union critiques of the NLRA 
regime can be addressed by state and local governments.  For this reason, it is those critiques that 
are the focus here.    
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On this front, however, tripartite labor lawmaking exhibits an im-
portant limitation.  Because states and cities have substantially more 
regulatory leverage over employers than over unions, tripartite labor 
lawmaking has a predictable political valence: it involves the exchange 
of some governmental action that is favorable to employers for private 
agreements that redesign organizing and bargaining rules in a manner 
that facilitates unionization.  Accordingly, tripartism enables substan-
tive responses to only one group of flaws in the NLRA: flaws that 
skew the law in a nonunion direction.  From a learning and experi-
mentalist perspective, tripartism’s uniform political valence produces a 
similar limitation, allowing us to learn about one — but only one — 
set of possible reforms. 
Although tripartism is designed to, and does in fact, permit varia-
tion that preemption would otherwise preclude, tripartite arrange-
ments also impact local lawmaking procedures in a set of unintended 
ways.  For this reason, identifying tripartite lawmaking requires that 
we recognize not only the fact of local variation, but also the legal and 
political  processes through which such variation is achieved.  Here, 
this Article addresses four concerns.  A first issue stems from the fact 
that tripartite lawmaking is an opaque form of lawmaking and accord-
ingly presents political accountability problems.  A second concern is 
that the formal separation between the public acts of local govern-
ments and the contractual orderings of private parties — a separation 
that is inherent in this form of lawmaking — can serve to insulate the 
functionally interdependent arrangement from constitutional and other 
forms of legal review.  A third issue relates to the form of local political 
participation that tripartite lawmaking requires.  Federalism scholars 
often critique broad preemption rules on the ground that they preclude 
political participation by citizens at the state and local level.14  But, 
because preemption prevents only direct state and local interventions 
into the federal regime and allows for tripartite forms of intervention, 
preemption does not in fact render local political participation irrele-
vant.  Rather, preemption reshapes local politics, leaving us with a 
kind of politics of indirection.15  So, while workers and their allies par-
ticipate actively in support of tripartite dealmaking, their participation 
cannot be focused on organizing and bargaining rights.  Instead, work-
ers must support the governmental objectives of employers.  Fourth 
and finally, because tripartite labor lawmaking requires states and lo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  14  See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91–94 (1995); Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389–94 (1997). 
  15  As discussed above, Fisk and Oswalt develop this insight in their analysis of Wal-Mart ac-
tivism.  See Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 10, at 1523–28.    
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calities to act in nonlabor areas of law, tripartism can have collateral 
effects on these other legal regimes.16 
In sum, tripartite lawmaking allows for departures from the federal 
regime, but it enables this variation in a manner that raises some con-
cerns.  In fact, the existence of tripartite lawmaking suggests that the 
current preemption regime should be troubling irrespective of one’s 
underlying position on preemption — irrespective, that is, of whether 
one believes that labor policy is appropriately set at the national or lo-
cal level.  Preemption’s proponents should be concerned both by the 
variation that tripartism allows and by the costs inherent in this form 
of lawmaking.17  And while preemption’s opponents may value the 
variation that tripartism permits, they should understand this varia-
tion as far too constrained and should also wish to avoid the costs in-
herent in achieving variation through tripartite arrangements. 
Practically, then, both proponents and opponents of federal labor 
preemption will have an interest in reforming the preemption regime 
in a manner that precludes, or alleviates the need for, tripartite law-
making.  Determining which specific type of reform is ideal  — or 
whether reform is superior to the status quo — would require resolu-
tion of the debate between national uniformity and local variation in 
contemporary labor law.18  This Article does not attempt to resolve 
that debate, but instead contributes to the discussion by suggesting 
and evaluating a range of possible legal reforms.  One set of reforms, 
appealing to preemption’s proponents, would attempt to eliminate tri-
partite lawmaking by either expanding or more rigorously enforcing 
preemption doctrine or by prohibiting private ordering.  Another set of 
reforms, which this Article concludes has a better chance of success, 
would relax the preemption rules in order to remove the conditions 
that call for tripartism in the first place. 
Finally, although this Article focuses on labor preemption and labor 
lawmaking, the analysis here indicates that the potential for tripartite 
lawmaking extends across multiple areas of law.  Indeed, the condi-
tions that enable tripartite lawmaking are quite common.  Across geo-
graphy and political orientation, state and local governments enjoy 
wide-ranging regulatory leverage over firms that operate within their 
jurisdictions.  Where organized interests have significant political in-
fluence at the state and local level, this governmental leverage can be 
exchanged for firms’ private agreement to the demands of the interest 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  16  As they become proxies for labor policy, these nonlabor areas of law can be altered in a 
unique manner distinct from more common forms of “logrolling.” 
  17  To the extent that preemption’s proponents view the policy outcomes tripartism allows as 
positive, they will want to achieve these outcomes through reforms of the federal law. 
  18  For some discussion of this topic, see, for example, Drummonds, supra note 3, at 101–03; 
Estlund, supra note 3, at 1599–1600; and Gottesman, supra note 3, at 399–407.    
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groups, even in the face of formally preemptive federal statutes.  For 
instance, in the environmental context, firms and community groups 
are developing “Good Neighbor Agreements” through which the firms 
agree to go beyond federally mandated environmental standards.  Be-
cause a firm’s acceptance of the Good Neighbor Agreement can be se-
cured in exchange for local governmental action in nonenvironmental 
areas of law, the potential for tripartite dealmaking and local depar-
tures from the federal regime is clear.  “Community Benefits Agree-
ments,” which bind developers to provide certain goods in exchange 
for local governmental action on zoning and permitting approvals, 
present another mechanism for tripartism and the avoidance of a wide 
range of preemption rules — including Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act19 (ERISA) and immigration preemption. 
This Article accordingly suggests the broad conclusion that where 
federal preemption coexists with the possibility for private ordering — 
a combination not at all rare — the potential for tripartite lawmaking 
will exist as well.  With tripartism, moreover, comes the possibility for 
local departures from formally preemptive federal laws and the un-
dermining of preemption’s ability to allocate exclusive regulatory au-
thority to the federal government.  And because the concerns regard-
ing the processes through which tripartite law is made inhere in the 
structure of tripartism — and are not dependent on the specific subject 
matter of the tripartite agreement — these concerns will also follow 
tripartism into nonlabor areas of law. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II outlines the current feder-
al regime governing union organizing and bargaining, along with the 
doctrine of federal labor preemption.  This Part also describes how 
federal labor law facilitates private reordering of the rules of organiz-
ing and bargaining, and it locates tripartite lawmaking among the sev-
eral mechanisms through which unions secure employer consent to 
these new rules.  Part III describes tripartite labor lawmaking and ex-
plores some analogues to it, including certain forms of European neo-
corporatism and the kind of governmental action implicated in the un-
constitutional conditions context.  Part IV begins by discussing the im-
plications of tripartite lawmaking for preemption analysis and for var-
iation in labor law, and then raises concerns regarding the legal and 
political process that tripartism involves.  Part V takes up three possi-
ble responses to tripartite lawmaking.  Part VI suggests extensions to 
other areas of law, and Part VII concludes. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  19  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).    
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II.  A LABOR LAW NUTSHELL: MOTIVES FOR REFORM, 
PREEMPTION, AND PRIVATE ORDERING 
A.  The Call for State and Local Innovation 
In order to ground the discussion that follows, it is useful to under-
stand what motivates certain states and cities — and unions in those 
states and cities — to seek a redesign of the NLRA rules of organizing 
and bargaining.  For more than three decades now, the labor move-
ment and leading labor law scholars have been withering in their criti-
cism of the NLRA.  Writing in 1983, Professor Paul Weiler commented 
that “[c]ontemporary American labor law more and more resembles an 
elegant tombstone for a dying institution.”20  In 1984, the House Sub-
committee on Labor-Management Relations released a report on “The 
Failure of Labor Law,” observing that the NLRA “has ceased to ac-
complish its purpose.”21  And in 1996, Professor James Brudney ar-
gued that “[s]ixty years after the National Labor Relations Act . . . was 
passed, collective action appears moribund.”22 
The primary substantive critique of the NLRA is that the federal 
rules of organizing and bargaining render employees’ statutory rights 
to form and join labor organizations, and to bargain collectively with 
management, ineffectual.23  Scholars have repeatedly noted the central 
problems.  When it comes to the rules of organizing, the regime pro-
vides employers with too much latitude to interfere with employees’ 
efforts at self-organization, while offering unions too few rights   
to communicate with employees about the merits of unionization.24  
The NLRB’s election machinery is dramatically too slow, enabling 
employers to defeat organizing drives through delay and attrition.25  
The NLRB’s remedial regime is also too weak to protect employees 
against employer retaliation.26  And, with respect to the statute’s goal 
of facilitating collective bargaining, the regime’s “good faith” bargain-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  20  Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers’ Rights to Self-Organization Under the 
NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769 (1983). 
  21  STAFF OF H. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MGMT. RELATIONS OF THE H. COMM. ON EDUC. 
&  LABOR,  98TH  CONG.,  THE  FAILURE  OF  LABOR  LAW  —  A  BETRAYAL  OF  AMERICAN 
WORKERS 1 (Comm. Print 1984). 
  22  James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. 
REV.  1563,  1563 ( 1996) (footnote omitted).  See generally Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, 
Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers,  69 C HI.-KENT  L.  REV.  59 
(1993). 
  23  See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2694–
2700 (2008).  See generally, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 110-23 (2007); Gottesman, supra note 22; Weiler, 
supra note 20.  
  24  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 12, at 933–34. 
  25  See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 20, at 1777 & n.24. 
  26  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 22, at 62 (“The NLRA does not protect workers meaning-
fully against employer reprisal for attempts to unionize . . . .”).    
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ing obligation is rendered meaningless by the Board’s inability to im-
pose contract terms as a remedy for a party’s failure to negotiate in 
good faith.27 
These pathologies in the NLRA have given rise to repeated calls 
for reform, both among scholars and in Washington, but none of the 
proposed reforms have succeeded.28  I n  1977, for example, Congress 
took up legislation that would have, first, minimized the opportunity 
for employer interference in organizing drives by mandating a short-
ened schedule for union elections,29 and, second, rebalanced communi-
cational opportunities by providing union organizers “equal access” to 
the workplace.30  The bill also would have strengthened the collective 
bargaining obligation by allowing the Board to impose make-whole 
remedies when employers violated their duty to bargain in good 
faith.31  Although the House passed its bill by a vote of 257 to 163, the 
Senate version was blocked by a five-week filibuster and died after six 
failed cloture votes.32  The most recent federal labor reform bill re-
sponded to the same concerns about employer interference in organiz-
ing drives and the weakness of the statutory bargaining obligation.   
Thus, to minimize employer involvement in union organizing efforts, 
the Employee Free Choice Act33 would have required that the Board 
certify unions based on a card check, thereby allowing unions to avoid 
the NLRB’s notoriously slow election process.34  To ensure compliance 
with the bargaining obligation, the bill also dictated that if the parties 
are unable to reach agreement on a first contract within four months, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  27  See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for 
Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 360–61 (1984); see also Fisk & Pulver, supra note 
13, at 55–59. 
  28  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 12, at 928–46 (summarizing past proposals); id. at 946–83 
(offering a new proposal for reform); Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Represen-
tation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495 (1993); Gottesman, supra note 3; 
Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1988); Clyde Summers, Unions Without Majority — A Black Hole?, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 531 (1990). 
  29  The bill was titled the Labor Reform Act of 1977.  H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 1883, 
95th Cong. (1977).  See also, e.g., 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 72 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et 
al. eds., 5th ed. 2006); Estlund, supra note 3, at 1540. 
  30  See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 29, at 72 (citing 34 CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY ALMANAC 285 (1978)). 
  31  See id. 
  32  See id.  In 1996, the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th 
Cong. (1996), also passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Clinton.  Estlund, 
supra note 3, at 1541.  On September 27, 1995, the House voted 221–202–11 in favor of the bill.  
See 141 CONG. REC. 26,613–19 (1995) (Roll No. 691).  On July 10, 1996, the Senate voted 53–46–
1 in favor.  See 142 CONG. REC. 16,470–76 (1996) (Rollcall Vote No. 191 Leg.).  This bill would 
have amended section 8(a)(2) of the statute to permit the establishment of certain “employee par-
ticipation programs.”  Estlund, supra note 3, at 1541 n.64; see also H.R. 743 § 3. 
  33  Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (2007). 
  34  For a discussion, see Sachs, supra note 12, at 668–72.    
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an arbitrator would determine the appropriate content of the con-
tract.35  Although the House of Representatives passed the Employee 
Free Choice Act in 2007, the bill was blocked by a threatened sena-
torial filibuster.36 
Accordingly, it is the conjunction of these pathologies in the federal 
law and the inability to reform the statute in Congress that explains 
the motivation for state and local reforms.  As Professor Michael Got-
tesman explains: 
The impetus for [a] reexamination of preemption law will be evident to 
those familiar with the present state of collective bargaining under the 
NLRA. . . . [T]he NLRA is not working effectively and the institution of 
collective bargaining is in decline.  The defects in the law have been iden-
tified with some precision, but Congress has shown itself too politically 
paralyzed to make repairs.37 
B. Prohibiting State and Local Reform: A “Rule  
of Total Federal Preemption” 
Attempts at state and local reform, however, must contend with  
the doctrine of federal labor preemption.  Although there is no express 
preemption clause in the National Labor Relations Act, the NLRA’s 
preemption regime is unquestionably and remarkably broad.38  
Prompted in part by a series of articles by Professor Archibald Cox in 
the Harvard Law Review,39 the Supreme Court has built a preemption 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  35  See H.R. 1409 § 3. 
  36  See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to Assist Unions, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2009, at A1; Alec MacGillis, Executives Detail Labor Bill Compromise, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 22, 2009, at A2.  In 2007, the bill died in the Senate after a cloture vote failed 51–48.  
See 153 CONG. REC. S8398 (daily ed. June 26, 2007). 
  37  Gottesman, supra note 3, at 360 (footnotes omitted). 
  38  See, e.g., id. at 374–83.  Labor preemption cases generally do not use the familiar typology 
of express, conflict, and field preemption.  See, e.g., Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemp-
tion, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2100–07 (2000) (explaining these categories of preemption analysis).  Be-
cause the NLRA has no preemption clause, labor preemption doctrine is clearly implied rather 
than express.  As the analysis to follow will reveal, although the cases do not employ these terms, 
the Court’s labor preemption rules reflect both conflict and field preemption principles.  See, e.g., 
Estlund, supra note 3, at 1571–73; Gottesman, supra note 3, at 357–59. 
    It is worth noting that the federal statute does explicitly allow states to depart from the fed-
eral regime by banning “union shop” agreements.  Although federal law protects such agreements, 
which condition employment on an employee’s agreement to pay union dues, section 14(b) of the 
federal law enables states to prohibit union shops through so-called right-to-work legislation.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (2006).  The interventions discussed in this Article involve neither union shop 
agreements nor right-to-work laws. 
  39  The relevant Cox articles are Archibald Cox & Marshall J. Seidman, Federalism and Labor 
Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211 (1950); Archibald Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Rela-
tions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954); and Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972).  For a discussion of Cox’s influence on the Supreme Court’s preemp-
tion doctrine, see Gottesman, supra note 3, at 389–91.  As Gottesman noted, “There can be little 
doubt as to the persuasiveness of Cox’ thinking to the Court.”  Id. at 390.    
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doctrine meant to vest exclusive regulatory authority in the federal 
government and to preclude state and local governments from varying 
the rules of organizing and bargaining.40  In 1950, Cox first argued for 
what he called “an integrated public labor policy”41 derived entirely 
from the National Labor Relations Act, and he warned that “enforce-
ment of  .  .  .  state regulation will thwart the development of federal 
policy.”42  Four years later he argued for a “rule of total federal 
preemption,”43 in order to ensure “uniformity.”44 
Shortly after Cox began writing, the Court set out what would be-
come the conceptual framework for its future labor preemption cases.  
In 1953, the Court held that: 
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced 
by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties. . . . Con-
gress evidently considered that centralized administration of specially   
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform application of   
its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to 
result from a variety of local procedures and attitudes toward labor   
controversies.45 
Then, in its sweeping 1959 decision San Diego Building Trades 
Council v. Garmon,46 the Court ruled that states may not regulate ac-
tivity that is even “arguably” protected or prohibited by the federal 
law.47  As such, employee activity protected (or arguably protected) by 
section 7 of the NLRA — including, for example, employees’ rights to 
form and join labor unions or to bargain collectively with their em-
ployers — is off limits to state or local regulation.  So, too, is employer 
speech about unionization, which enjoys protection under section 8(c) 
of the statute.48  Similarly, because collective bargaining is both pro-
tected by section 7 and policed by section 8’s unfair labor practice 
clauses, bargaining rules and obligations are also beyond the reach of 
state and local law.49 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  40  The Supreme Court has held that labor preemption doctrine applies equally to state and 
local government action.  See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608,  
614 n.5 (1986). 
  41  Cox & Seidman, supra note 39, at 230. 
  42  Id. at 228. 
  43  Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, supra note 39, at 1315. 
  44  Id. at 1317.  As Gottesman has written, “Cox invited the Court to preempt in the name  
of a comprehensive federal labor policy which he eloquently portrayed.”  Gottesman, supra note  
3, at 390. 
  45  Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490 (1953). 
  46  359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
  47  Id. at 245.  
  48  See id.; see also Gottesman, supra note 3, at 379 n.95 (“[Section 8(c)] likely would be a pred-
icate for inferring federal ‘protection’ of such [employer] speech against state regulation.”). 
  49  Garmon preemption admits of two exceptions to the general rule.  If the conduct at issue is 
“a merely peripheral concern of the [NLRA],” Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243, or if it “touch[es] inter-
ests  . . . deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,” the Court will “not infer that Congress 
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Although Garmon preemption is extremely broad,50 in its 1976 de-
cision Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Committee,51 the Supreme Court extended the 
reach of federal labor preemption even further.  There, the Court took 
up the permissibility of state regulation of union activity that, while 
part of the collective bargaining process, was neither protected nor 
prohibited by the federal law.52  The Court reasoned that Congress’s 
decision to leave certain activity unregulated by the NLRA implied a 
congressional intent that these forms of union and employer conduct 
be left entirely unregulated.53  Thus, according to Machinists, the ab-
sence of federal regulation implied that “Congress intended that the 
conduct involved be . . . left ‘to be controlled by the free play of eco-
nomic forces’”54 and “not to be regulable by States any more than by 
the NLRB.”55 
Garmon and Machinists form the two primary strands of labor 
preemption doctrine, but two other cases extend the doctrine further 
still.  The first is Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,56 
which involved a strike by Teamsters Union employees at a Los An-
geles taxi cab company.  At the time of the strike, Golden State Transit 
needed to renew its operating license in order to continue providing 
taxi service.  The renewal required approval by the Los Angeles Board 
of Transportation Commissioners and, ultimately, by the Los Angeles 
City Council.57  Although Golden State was “in compliance with all 
terms and conditions of their franchise[],”58 the city council rejected 
the renewal request.59  The Supreme Court held that the council’s de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
had deprived the States of the power to act,” id. at 244.  Very few decisions have found that state 
action escapes preemption under the “peripheral concern” exception.  See 2 THE DEVELOPING 
LABOR LAW, supra note 30, at 2337–38.  Picket-line violence is the classic example of conduct 
that meets the “local responsibility” exception, and may be prosecuted under state law.  See, e.g., 
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 n.2 (citing United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 
656 ( 1954) (upholding state damages award against union that threatened nonunion employer 
with violence)).  States also generally remain free to enforce trespass laws during organizing drives 
and labor disputes.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 
436 U.S. 180 (1978). 
  50  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 377–78 (noting that Garmon’s preemption of claims 
that are “arguably” protected by federal law is a “departure from the preemption rules applied 
with respect to other federal statutes,” id. at 378); id. at 382. 
  51  427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
  52  Id. at 132–33.  The case involved a union policy under which employees refused to work 
overtime.  Id. at 134.  
  53  Id. at 141. 
  54  Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). 
  55  Id. at 149. 
  56  475 U.S. 608 (1986). 
  57  See id. at 609–11. 
  58  Id. at 610 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  59  See id. at 611.    
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cision was designed to pressure Golden State to settle the Teamsters’ 
strike and was, for this reason, preempted.60  According to the Court, 
the Teamsters’ right to strike, and Golden State’s attempt to withstand 
the strike, were the kinds of economic weapons that Congress had in-
tended to leave free of regulation and up to the “free play of economic 
forces.”61  By refusing to renew Golden State’s franchise until the 
company settled the strike, Los Angeles “imposed a positive durational 
limit on the exercise of economic self-help”62 and thereby impermissi-
bly intruded into a collective bargaining process that Congress in-
tended to be free of such regulatory intervention.63 
The second case is the Court’s most recent labor preemption deci-
sion, Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,64 which struck down a Califor-
nia statute that prohibited employers from using state funds to “assist, 
promote, or deter union organizing.”65  Noting that “California plainly 
could not directly regulate noncoercive speech about unionization by 
means of an express prohibition,” the Court held that it was “equally 
clear that California may not indirectly regulate such conduct by im-
posing spending restrictions on the use of state funds.”66  That is, be-
cause employers’ right to engage in noncoercive speech about unioni-
zation is protected by section 8(c) of the federal law, states may neither 
directly restrict employer speech rights nor explicitly predicate the re-
ceipt of state benefits on an employer’s agreement to refrain from ex-
ercising these rights.67 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  60  The council’s vote came after “the labor dispute and the franchise renewal issue had become 
clearly intertwined.”  Id. at 610.  As the Court put it, “[t]he strike was central to the [franchise] 
discussion,” with one city council member “charg[ing] Golden State with negotiating unreasona-
bly” and another “accus[ing] the company of trying to ‘brea[k] the back of the union’” during a 
council hearing on Golden State’s renewal application.  Id. at 611 (final alteration in original) (ci-
tations omitted).  At a council meeting, moreover, four council members “conveyed the settlement 
condition to the parties as the council’s ‘bottom line’ on the issue.”  Id. at 615 n.6. 
  61  Id. at 614 (quoting Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm., 427 
U.S. 132, 140 (1976)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
  62  Id. at 615. 
  63  See id. at 619.  In a subsequent chapter of the Golden State litigation, the Court also held 
that the taxi company was entitled, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), to maintain a suit for compen-
satory damages from the City.  See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 
103 (1989). 
  64  128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008). 
  65  Id. at 2416 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16646(b) (Deering 2010)). 
  66  Id. at 2414–15. 
  67  See id. at 2416–17.  As the California law at issue in Brown placed “considerable pressure 
on an employer either to forgo his ‘free speech right to communicate his views to his employees’ 
or else to refuse the receipt of any state funds,” id. at 2416 (quoting NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 
395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969)), the Court held that the law “impermissibly ‘predicat[es] benefits on re-
fraining from conduct protected by federal labor law,’” id. at 2416–17 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 116 (1994)). 
    As noted below, a broad reading of Golden State and Brown might have reached the City’s 
conduct during the New Haven Cancer Center development campaign.  See section V.A, pp. 
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While these cases establish a broad preemption regime, the Court 
has created one relatively significant exception to the rule: when   
a state or local government acts as a market participant, it enjoys   
the same freedom to structure its labor policies as a private party   
and is immune from preemption scrutiny.  As the Court put it in   
its 1985 Boston Harbor68 decision: “When a State owns and manages 
property, for example, it must interact with private participants in   
the marketplace.  In so doing, the State is not subject to pre-emption 
by the NLRA, because pre-emption doctrines apply only to state   
regulation.”69 
Despite the potential breadth of the proprietary exception,70 the 
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have established its limits.  
To start, the basic fact that a state or city acts pursuant to its spending 
power, rather than through regulation, does not exempt the action 
from preemption review.  Indeed, the Court has dismissed as a “dis-
tinction without a difference” the fact that a state acts by spending ra-
ther than regulating.71  Instead, the applicability of the market partici-
pant exception requires that the state or locality demonstrate that   
its intervention is “specifically tailored to one particular job,” and that 
the intervention is directly aimed at advancing the government’s   
proprietary interest by, for example, “ensur[ing] an efficient project 
that would be completed as quickly and effectively as possible at the 
lowest cost.”72 
In sum, after surveying the labor preemption field, Professor Cyn-
thia Estlund concluded that the Supreme Court’s preemption cases 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
1213–17.  If so, this instance of tripartite labor lawmaking survives because of difficulties with 
preemption enforcement, as also discussed below, rather than because the government’s action 
takes place outside the scope of the current preemption regime.  For a discussion, see sections 
III.B, pp. 1190–93; and V.A, pp. 1213–17. 
  68  Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc. 
(Boston Harbor), 507 U.S. 218 (1993). 
  69  Id. at 227. 
  70  The phrase “potential breadth” indicates that the proprietary exception, taken to a logical 
extreme, would swallow the entire preemption regime.  Almost any state or city action that im-
pacts labor-management relations will have some impact on state and local tax revenues.  Thus, a 
state plausibly could argue that outlawing unions entirely would increase productivity and there-
by increase state tax revenues.  On the other hand, a city could contend that mandating unioniza-
tion would increase labor peace and thereby increase city tax revenues.  For this reason — as ex-
plained immediately below — the fact that a state or local rule has an impact on general state and 
local revenue streams is never enough to qualify for the proprietary exemption. 
  71  Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 287 (1986).  
The question for the Court is, instead, whether the spending power is used as a “legitimate re-
sponse to state procurement constraints or to local economic needs,” Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2415 
(quoting Gould, 475 U.S. at 291) (internal quotation marks omitted), or whether it is instead used 
as a mechanism for “setting [labor] policy,” id. (quoting Boston Harbor, 507 U.S. at 229) (internal 
quotation mark omitted). 
  72  Brown,  128 S. Ct. at 2415 (quoting Boston Harbor,  507 U.S. at 232) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).    
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“virtually banish states and localities from the field of labor rela-
tions,”73 and that “[m]odern labor law preemption essentially ousts 
states and municipalities from tinkering with the machinery of union 
organizing, collective bargaining, and labor-management conflict.”74  
Most recently, Professor Henry Drummonds summarized the current 
view by writing: “[The] broad federal labor relations preemption doc-
trines ensnarl all states in a stifling and exclusive  .  .  .  federal labor   
law regime.”75 
C.  Facilitating Private Reordering 
Although the NLRA prohibits state and local governments from in-
tervening in union organizing and bargaining, the law affirmatively 
facilitates the private reordering of organizing and bargaining rules by 
unions and employers.  As construed by the NLRB, “[n]ational labor 
policy favors the honoring of voluntary agreements reached between 
employers and labor organizations,”76 and accordingly the Board “will 
enforce such agreements, including agreements that explicitly address 
matters involving union representation.”77  Thus, so long as their 
agreements do not waive or violate employee rights, unions and em-
ployers are free to depart from the NLRA’s rules and to adopt alterna-
tive procedures regarding union organizing, recognition, and bargain-
ing procedures.78  For example, although employers are not statutorily 
obligated to recognize a union on the basis of signed authorization 
cards,79 an employer may contractually agree with a union to do so.80  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  73  Estlund, supra note 3, at 1572.  Estlund wrote prior to the Court’s decision in Brown. 
  74  Id. at 1571. 
  75  Drummonds, supra note 3, at 99. 
  76  Verizon Info. Sys., 335 N.L.R.B. 558, 559 (2001) (quoting Pall Biomedical Prods. Corp., 331 
N.L.R.B. 1674, 1677 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  77  Id.; see also Hous. Div. of the Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388, 389 (1975) (reviewing clauses 
through which employer waived right to demand election and holding that “national labor policy 
favors enforcing their validity”). 
  78  See, e.g., Hotel & Rest. Emps. Union Local 217 v. J.P . Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 564–65 
(2d Cir. 1993).  See generally Sachs, supra note 9, at 377–82 (observing a trend toward opting out 
of the NLRA regime in favor of private ordering).  The prohibition on agreements that waive or 
violate employee rights is expressed in, for example, Hotel Employees, Restaurant Employees   
Union, Local 2 v. Marriott Corp., 961 F.2d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1992); and Local No. 3-193 Inter-
national Woodworkers of America v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir. 1980). 
  79  See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974). 
  80  See, e.g., Terracon, Inc., 339 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (2003); Stamford Taxi, Inc., 332 N.L.R.B. 
1372, 1402 (2000); Snow, 134 N.L.R.B. 709, 710–11 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); 
see also J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d at 566.  When an employer agrees to an alternative recogni-
tion process, courts will enforce that agreement by, for example, requiring that the employer bar-
gain with the union if the union presents cards signed by a majority of employees.  See id.  Where 
the parties agree to an alternative recognition process, moreover, the Board will defer to that 
agreement and decline either party’s request for a representation election.  See  Verizon,  335 
N.L.R.B. at 559 n.7, 560.    
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Similarly, although the statutory regime affords employers significant 
opportunities to communicate anti-union messages to employees, em-
ployers may agree to waive or limit their own right to speak about  
unionization during organizing drives.81  Employers also may — and 
frequently do  — agree to allow union organizers access to the 
workplace, although employers almost never have a statutory obliga-
tion to provide for such access rights;82 to provide unions with lists of 
employees’ names and addresses prior to any legal obligation to do 
so;83 and to submit first contract disputes to final and binding arbitra-
tion, although the NLRA never requires that employers reach agree-
ment in collective negotiations with a union.84 
When unions and employers agree to alternative organizing and 
bargaining rules, moreover, these agreements are “contracts between 
an employer and a labor organization,” which, by virtue of section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act,85 are enforceable in federal 
district court.86  And, indeed, federal courts have routinely enforced 
contracts through which unions and employers agree that union recog-
nition will be based on a card check, that employers will remain neu-
tral on the question of unionization (or will significantly restrict their 
communications on that question), and that union organizers will be 
entitled to access employer property for the purpose of convincing em-
ployees to support the organizing effort.87 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  81  See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Marriott, 961 F.2d at 1469–70. 
  82  See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 7, at 826 & n.33. 
  83  Verizon, 335 N.L.R.B. at 558. 
  84  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) (bargaining obligation “does not compel either party to agree 
to a proposal or require the making of a concession” (emphasis added)). 
  85  Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–187).  The NLRA, enacted in 1935, was amended in 1947 by the 
LMRA, which added, among other provisions, section 301.  As is the convention, this article uses 
NLRA to refer both to the original statute and to the later-enacted amendments to that statute, 
including the provisions of the LMRA. 
  86  29 U.S.C. § 185(a).  Courts will not enforce private agreements that call for employer recog-
nition of a union absent some demonstration that a majority of employees support unionization.  
See, e.g., Marriott, 961 F.2d at 1468; Local No. 3-193 Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Ketchikan 
Pulp Co., 611 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1980). 
  87  See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977, 979, 984 (9th Cir. 
2003) (agreement to arbitrate disputes over, inter alia, neutrality and access agreement); Hotel & 
Rest. Emps. Union Local 217 v. J.P. Morgan Hotel, 996 F.2d 561, 563, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1993) (card 
check and neutrality agreement); Marriott, 961 F.2d at 1465–66, 1468, 1470 (same).  Although not 
noted by the court, the agreement enforced in St. Vincent Medical Center contained an access 
clause that permitted “a reasonable number of [union] organizers . . . access to . . . public areas 
inside and outside the facility.”  Agreement between Catholic Healthcare W. & Serv. Emps. Int’l 
Union § II.E.6.b, at 6 (Apr. 4, 2001) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Although 
there are no reported instances of a court being called upon to resolve the specific question of 
whether an agreement to submit first contract negotiations to arbitration is enforceable under sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA, it is a central principle of federal labor law that courts will enforce agree-
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The private reordering of organizing and bargaining rules that the 
NLRA permits often occurs without state or local governmental inter-
vention of any kind — through what we might think of as bipartite la-
bor lawmaking.  That is, by facilitating private ordering, labor law 
enables unions to use multiple sources of leverage to encourage em-
ployers to depart from the federal rules and adopt alternative ones; lo-
cal political power is one source of leverage, but it is not the only 
one.88  Indeed, the most straightforward way that unions secure such 
organizing agreements is through the traditional collective bargaining 
process: where unions already represent some segment of an employ-
er’s workforce, they can incorporate clauses in existing collective bar-
gaining agreements requiring that additional employees of the same 
employer be organized according to privately negotiated rules like card 
check and neutrality.89  In other instances, employers enter into private 
organizing agreements in order to avoid costs that unions could other-
wise impose.  These costs can come from traditional union actions like 
strikes and picketing.  Or they can be imposed through less traditional 
tactics including “comprehensive campaigns” in which unions, for ex-
ample, encourage pension funds to withhold investment capital from 
targeted firms.90  Thus, the type of political exchange involved in tri-
partite labor lawmaking can be understood as an example of this 
broader phenomenon, an example in which unions leverage their state 
and local political power — rather than their economic power — to se-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ments to arbitrate labor-management disputes.  See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of 
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). 
  88  See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 7, at 837–38; Hartley, supra note 7, at 387–91. 
  89  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 1604 (“Unions may also have leverage within existing 
bargaining relationships, and may be able to negotiate neutrality agreements for those same em-
ployers’ new locations.”); Hartley, supra note 7, at 387–89.  There is no reliable empirical data on 
the pervasiveness of this practice.  The prevalence of these clauses in NLRB and appellate court 
litigation suggests that they are far from uncommon.  See, e.g., Verizon Info. Sys., 335 N.L.R.B. 
558, 558–59 (2001); Pall Biomedical Prods. Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 1674, 1674 (2000), enforcement 
denied, 275 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2002); United Mine Workers of Am., 231 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1977); 
Hous. Div. of the Kroger Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 388, 388 (1975); Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, 
Assoc. Gen. Counsel, NLRB, to Alan B. Reichard, Reg’l Dir. Region 32, NLRB 3–4 (Feb. 23, 
2005),  available at http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Advice%20Memos/2005/32-CA-21266-1.pdf 
(first contract dispute at one hospital facility settled when parties agreed to, inter alia, a “state-
wide organizing agreement,” id. at 3). 
  90  See Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer Motiva-
tions for Negotiating Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in J USTICE  ON  THE JOB: PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 139, 
147 (Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006).  In other cases, the union’s leverage comes from its ability 
to offer a benefit to employers.  For example, when unionization is useful in securing business — 
through contracts from purchasing firms that are themselves unionized, or from customers who 
are attracted by the “union label” — unions can convince employers to enter into private organiz-
ing agreements that depart from the NLRA model.  See id.  Both Brudney and Hartley provide 
excellent summaries of the various ways in which organizing agreements are reached.  See Brud-
ney, supra note 7, at 835–40; Hartley, supra note 7, at 387–96.    
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cure employer agreement on an altered set of organizing and bargain-
ing rules. 
Regardless of the source of leverage used to secure these agree-
ments, private organizing agreements erode some of the uniformity 
that labor law’s preemption regime is committed to securing.  In this 
respect, the NLRA is in tension with itself even in the absence of state 
and local intervention: while the preemption regime aims to ensure a 
uniform set of organizing and bargaining rules derived exclusively 
from federal law, the solicitude for private ordering implies that unions 
with sufficient bargaining power will be able to secure departures from 
these national defaults.  But unions’ ability to leverage state and local 
political power to secure private agreements on organizing rules is of 
particular relevance to the preemption regime.  Indeed, the existence  
of this form of political exchange reveals that state and local govern-
ments are an important source of labor law variation and a viable fo-
rum for the types of reform that have been impossible to achieve at the 
federal level — possibilities that preemption is intended and under-
stood to foreclose.91 
In sum, the NLRA intends to prohibit state and local government 
intervention into the rules of organizing and bargaining, while at the 
same time allowing for private reordering of those rules.  As the next 
Part will describe, although labor law intends to distinguish between 
reorderings effected by local governments and those effected by pri-
vate parties, contemporary developments are characterized by the in-
terdependence of these two sources of authority.92 
III.  TRIPARTITE LAWMAKING 
There is no question that labor law’s exceptionally expansive 
preemption regime precludes state and local governments from at-
tempting directly to achieve at a local level the reforms that have been 
blocked in Congress.  A state law or city ordinance mandating that 
private sector employers recognize unions based on a card check,93 or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  91  See Estlund, supra note 3, at 1579 (“[P]opular impulses [for reform] that are stymied at the 
federal level have no outlet at the state and local level . . . .”). 
  92  On the “interdependence” of the public and private, see Jody Freeman, The Private Role in 
Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 564–65 (2000).  See infra note 237. 
  93  A state or local law mandating card check recognition would directly conflict with 29 
U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006).  In 2010, four states approved constitutional amendments that are 
intended to prohibit employees from selecting a union through any method other than a secret 
ballot election, including through a card check process.  See A RIZ. CONST. art. II, § 37; S.D. 
CONST. art. VI, § 28; UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 8.  South Carolina voters approved a similar con-
stitutional amendment in the 2010 general election, although the amendment has not yet been of-
ficially incorporated into the state constitution.  See H.B. No. 3305, 2009–2010 Gen. Assemb., 
118th Sess. (S.C. 2010) (enacted) (containing the text of the proposed amendment and indicating 
that it will be codified in article II, section 12 of the state constitution); Statewide Results: 2010 
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grant union organizers access to employer property,94 or remain neu-
tral during organizing drives,95 would be flatly preempted by the 
NLRA.  So too would a local law mandating that collective bargaining 
disputes be submitted to an arbitrator.96  Neither could state and local 
governments achieve these same labor policy goals simply by substitut-
ing public spending restrictions for regulation: requiring employers to 
recognize unions based on cards, to remain neutral, or to grant access 
to organizers in order to access state funding streams would also run 
afoul of the preemption regime.97  But understanding the way preemp-
tion operates in practice requires that we look beyond preemption doc-
trine itself. 
To this end, this Part will describe in some detail the ways in which 
organizing and bargaining rules are being redesigned in states and cit-
ies today through political exchanges involving the public acts of local 
governments and the private agreements of unions and employers.   
The Part begins by providing four examples of tripartite labor law-
making.  It then clarifies the government’s role in these examples, and 
it concludes with a discussion of partial analogues to tripartite law-
making by drawing on both international and domestic sources. 
A.  State and Local Labor Law 
This section describes four instances of tripartite labor lawmaking 
in U.S. states and cities and briefly notes where other examples, not 
developed here, may lie.  Although tripartite lawmaking has several 
variants, each involves a political exchange.  The arrangement is pred-
icated on an employer, or group of employers, seeking state or local 
government action on an issue unrelated to labor relations and union 
organizing.  The union party to the tripartite arrangement desires to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
General Election, S.C. STATE ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.enr-scvotes.org/SC/19077/40477/ 
en/summary.html (last visited Jan. 30,  2011) (indicating that the amendment passed with an   
eighty-two percent majority).  These amendments directly conflict with federal law and are plain-
ly preempted by the NLRA, as the NLRB recently concluded.  See Press Release, Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., Office of the Gen. Counsel, NLRB Advises Attorneys General in Four States that 
Secret-Ballot Amendments Are Preempted by Federal Labor Law (Jan. 14,  2011),  available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2011/R-2812.pdf. 
  94  Estlund imagines an alternative preemption regime in which states could potentially “create 
broader rights of access to the workplace for organizers” and “mandate card-check recognition,” 
but recognizes that “[u]nder the broader preemption doctrine that we have instead, there is no 
room for these variations.”  Estlund, supra note 3, at 1578–79, 1579 n.230. 
  95  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 379 n.95; see also Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 
128 S. Ct. 2408, 2414–15 (2008) (“California plainly could not directly regulate noncoercive speech 
about unionization . . . .”). 
  96  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 361 n.23. 
  97  See Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2415 (“It is equally clear that California may not indirectly regulate 
[noncoercive speech about unionization] by imposing spending restrictions on the use of state 
funds.”).    
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replace the NLRA’s rules with procedures that better facilitate unioni-
zation and collective bargaining.  Tripartite lawmaking involves the 
exchange of the governmental actions sought by the employer for pri-
vate contractual agreements through which the employer binds itself 
to the new rules of organizing and bargaining that the union seeks.  In 
some examples, the state or local government is an explicit partner in 
tripartite negotiations: the government agrees to act in the way the 
employer desires if and only if the employer agrees to new organizing 
and bargaining rules.  In other cases, the state or local government 
does not participate in three-way negotiations, but rather enacts the 
employer’s desired reforms in response to the union’s political influ-
ence — influence brought to bear because of the employer’s agreement 
on organizing and bargaining rules.  In all cases, the end result is a set 
of organizing and bargaining rules that differs dramatically from the 
NLRA’s and that, as discussed above, is fully enforceable as a matter 
of federal labor law. 
The examples of tripartite lawmaking presented in this Part are in-
tended to serve four broad purposes.  First, they reveal the existence of 
tripartism and describe its contours.  Second, the examples suggest 
that the phenomenon of tripartite lawmaking may well be widespread.  
Although the opacity of these deals means it is impossible to determine 
exactly how prevalent they have become, tripartite labor lawmaking 
can flourish in any jurisdiction in which the government possesses 
regulatory authority over employers and in which unions enjoy signifi-
cant local political power.  These conditions, while not universal, are 
far from rare.  Third, and irrespective of tripartism’s current scope, by 
revealing the existence of and possibility for tripartite lawmaking, the 
examples clarify the way that preemption operates in practice and   
thereby allow for a new and more complete assessment of the preemp-
tion regime.  And fourth, the examples enable us to identify extensions 
to other areas of law. 
1.  The New Haven Cancer Center. — Beginning in late 1998 and 
lasting for approximately a decade, the New England Health Care 
Employees, District 1199 engaged in a campaign to organize employees 
at the Yale–New Haven Hospital.98  The campaign was conducted 
under traditional NLRA rules, and it was continually acrimonious.99  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  98  See, e.g., Yale–New Haven Hosp. v. New England Health Care Emps., Dist. 1199 (2007) 
(Kern, Arb.), http://www.ynhhunion.org/newsletter/report-071022.pdf [hereinafter Kern Arbitra-
tion Award]; Affidavit of David Pickus in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary In-
junction ¶ 4, at 1, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Yale–New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-01673-
JCH (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Pickus Affidavit] (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library); Garret Condon, Yale Finds Itself in Fight over Cancer Center, HARTFORD COURANT, 
May 22, 2005, at A1 (reporting that “[t]he current conflict with the union is only the latest chapter 
in an acrimonious, seven-year struggle”). 
  99  See, e.g., Condon, supra note 98.    
2011]  DESPITE PREEMPTION  1175 
Part of the longstanding fight between the union and the hospital con-
cerned the rules under which the organizing would proceed.  Pointing 
to what it saw as flaws in the NLRA process, the union pressed the 
hospital to agree to an alternative set of organizing rules including “an 
enforceable agreement that prevents anti-union activity by the hospi-
tal.”100  Hospital management, however, contended “that the NLRB 
process is fair” and stated “that it would never agree to an election in 
which management was barred from telling its side of the story.”101  
Despite years of effort, the union was unsuccessful in its attempts   
to reach agreement with the hospital on alternate organizing rules; it 
was similarly unsuccessful in its attempts to organize the Yale–New 
Haven employees. 
Then, in November 2004, the hospital announced plans to build a 
$430 million cancer center.102  Hospital officials believed that they 
would start work on the project in September 2005, but construction 
could not begin until the City of New Haven issued a series of permit-
ting, construction, and zoning approvals.  Construction would require, 
among other things, City approval for the demolition of a building on 
the planned cancer center site, the City’s agreement to create a new 
zoning category, City approvals for construction of both underground 
tunnels and overhead walkways, and the transfer of City land to the 
hospital for use as a parking garage.103 
The union sought to have the City tie approval of the cancer center 
development plans to the hospital’s agreement on a privately nego-
tiated set of organizing rules for existing hospital employees.104  Accor-
dingly, the union encouraged New Haven aldermen and the City’s 
mayor, John DeStefano Jr., to withhold their approval of the project 
until the hospital agreed to “allow [the union] to conduct a union elec-
tion outside the constraints of existing federal guidelines.”105  Mayor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  100  Id. 
  101  Id. 
  102  See, e.g., id.; Alison Leigh Cowan, Connecticut Hospital’s Plan for Cancer Center May Offer 
Union Leverage in Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 40. 
  103  See, e.g., Garret Condon, State Approves Cancer Center Plans, HARTFORD  COURANT, 
Sept. 8, 2005, at B4.  Much of what was required for construction to begin can be seen in the De-
velopment Agreement that the City and Yale–New Haven Hospital ultimately signed in June 
2006.  See Development Agreement Between the City of New Haven and Yale–New Haven 
Hosp., Inc. § 3.02, at 10–12 (June 6, 2006) [hereinafter New Haven Development Agreement] (on 
file with the Harvard Law School Library).  State approvals were also required, but these were 
issued by early September 2005.  See Condon, supra. 
  104  See, e.g., Condon, supra note 103.  The fact that the organizing agreement was intended to 
cover existing hospital employees, while the City’s actions involved the new cancer center con-
struction, reveals that the City had no proprietary interest in the organizing agreement.  See supra 
p. 1168. 
  105  Condon, supra note 103; see also Condon, supra note 98 (“[T]he health care workers’ union 
and its supporters are pressuring the city to delay approval of the project . . . .”).  The union was 
joined in its effort by several New Haven community organizations that sought other commit-
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DeStefano and the aldermen were sympathetic to the union’s position.  
Indeed, the City had embraced the broad goal of accountable devel-
opment.106  In 2004, for example, the Board of Aldermen adopted a 
resolution urging all developers in the City to negotiate community 
benefits agreements with resident groups.107  And in March of 2005, 
the aldermen wrote to Yale–New Haven Hospital requesting specif-
ically that it engage in negotiations with a community organization 
over such an agreement for the cancer center.108  Electoral politics like-
ly played a role in the City’s position as well.  During the cancer center 
development negotiations, for example, Mayor DeStefano was engaged 
in a close race for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, and sup-
port from the union movement was critical to his election prospects.109 
In any event, by March of 2005, Mayor DeStefano had “warned the 
hospital that a failure to solve labor problems . . . could lead the Dem-
ocrat-controlled Board of Aldermen to put up obstacles to the 
project.”110  In May, Mayor DeStefano stated publicly that he was “pro 
building the cancer center and pro having a vote [on unionization] one 
way or another and having that vote be one where not any of the par-
ties exert intimidation.”111  By November, the editorial page of the 
Hartford Courant commented that while Mayor DeStefano “has said 
he favors the cancer center project,” he was not pushing hard for it 
“because New Haven politicians back a demand by District 1199 of 
the New England Health Care Employees Union . . . to unionize about 
1,800 service workers at the hospital.”112  Indeed, the hospital’s chief 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
ments from the hospital through a “community benefits agreement.”  See id.; Cowan, supra note 
102; Kim Martineau, Cancer Center a Go in New Haven, HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 23, 2006, 
at A1.  See generally Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the 
Democratic City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 509–17 (2009) (discussing community benefits agree-
ments and their use in “labor-friendly redistribution,” id. at 520). 
  106  See generally JULIAN GROSS ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING 
DEVELOPMENT  PROJECTS  ACCOUNTABLE  (2005), http://www.communitybenefits.org/down 
loads/CBA%20Handbook%202005%20final.pdf (describing the features of community benefits 
agreements and discussing recent examples); Schragger, supra note 105, at 508–12 (same).  For an 
example of the City’s embrace of accountable development, see Letter from City of New Haven 
Board of Aldermen to Joseph Zaccagnino, President and CEO, Yale–New Haven Hosp. (Mar. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter Zaccagnino Letter] (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  107  City of New Haven Bd. of Aldermen, Resolution Encouraging Developers to Enter into 
Community Benefits Agreements (May 17, 2004) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  108  Zaccagnino Letter, supra note 106. 
  109  See, e.g., Marc Santora, New Haven Mayor Declares Win in Primary for Governor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at B5 (“With strong support from organized labor, Mayor John DeStefano 
Jr. of New Haven declared victory last night in a close race for the Democratic nomination for 
governor of Connecticut . . . .”). 
  110  Cowan, supra note 102. 
  111  Condon, supra note 98 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
  112  Editorial, Cancer Center Stuck in Neutral, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 6, 2005, at C2.  In 
a later arbitration proceeding between Yale–New Haven Hospital and the union, the arbitrator 
concluded that “Mayor John DeStefano and the City of New Haven . . . were unwilling to issue 
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of staff was so frustrated by the delay in project approval by March of 
2006 that he commented, “We couldn’t build an outhouse at Yale–New 
Haven Hospital now and get it through the city planning process.”113 
When a public hearing on the cancer center development was final-
ly scheduled for March 22,  2006, representatives from the City, the 
hospital, and the union met to negotiate a tripartite resolution.114  The 
results of that negotiation were announced on March 23 at a city hall 
news conference and in an official press release from Mayor DeStefa-
no’s office titled “City, Yale New Haven Hospital and Union Reach 
Accord on Cancer Center.”115  The release quoted Mayor DeStefano as 
saying that the agreement “provides for all of our goals at once: state-
of-the-art care for cancer patients and their families, good, stable jobs 
for residents of our City . . . and a fair and civil outcome on labor is-
sues.”116  According to the Mayor, the agreement, which was to be sent 
to the Board of Aldermen for approval, contained three components.  
The first was a “land disposition agreement that governs the leasing 
and eventual transfer of property needed for the site.”117  The second 
was an agreement by the hospital to provide “a host of community 
benefits,” including a voluntary payment to the City.118  T h e  t h i r d  
component was, finally, “an agreement between the hospital and Local 
1199 that provides a fair process for a secret ballot election.”119 
Despite the relatively public approach that the Mayor’s office took 
to these negotiations, when the City and the hospital formalized the 
Development Agreement approving the cancer center project, the 
Agreement reflected the first two components of this tripartite settle-
ment, but not the third.  Thus, through the Development Agreement, 
the City approved the project and committed to a specific project 
schedule,120 and the hospital committed to its community benefit obli-
gations — including several jobs programs, a youth initiative, and a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
zoning approvals within their purview absent movement by the employer toward a resolution of 
the union’s organizing campaign.”  Kern Arbitration Award, supra note 98, at 2 (citation omitted). 
  113  Christopher Rowland, Hospitals Expect Hardball Push to Unionize, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 24, 
2006, at C1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  114  See Martineau, supra note 105 (“After pulling two near all-nighters, top executives for the 
hospital, the city and the unions reached a historic agreement Wednesday afternoon, just hours 
before a public hearing to discuss the project.”). 
  115  Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of New Haven, City, Yale New Haven Hospital and 
Union Reach Accord on Cancer Center (Mar. 23,  2006),  available at http://www.cityof 
newhaven.com/Mayor/ReadMore.asp?ID={592D8158-E1A9-40E6-A9C7-8CFA8AC55B29}. 
  116  Id. 
  117  Id. 
  118  Id. 
  119  Id. 
  120  See New Haven Development Agreement, supra note 103, § 3.02, at 10–12.    
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voluntary payment to the City.121  No provision was made in the De-
velopment Agreement, however, for a union organizing process.122 
Nonetheless, following the March settlement between the three par-
ties, and under the mediation of Mayor DeStefano,123 representatives 
of the employer and the union met in the Mayor’s offices and “agreed 
to the terms of an election principles agreement.”124  Although the par-
ties reached agreement on the new organizing rules on April 13, 
2006,125 implementation of the agreement was made contingent on 
New Haven issuing the requisite development approvals.126  Those 
approvals were in fact issued on June 6, 2006,127 and the agreement — 
formally titled the “Hospital and Union Representation Election Prin-
ciples Agreement”128 — became effective on June 7.129 
The Election Principles Agreement established a series of union or-
ganizing rules that departed from the federal regime.  For example, al-
though the NLRA permits employers to hold one-on-one meetings 
with employees to discourage them from supporting unionization,130 
the Agreement here provided that “[h]ospital supervisors and manag-
ers . . . shall not initiate one-on-one conversations with Eligible Voters 
regarding the subject of unionization.”131  The employer also agreed, 
again in contradistinction to the requirements of the federal rules,132 to 
provide union organizers with access to hospital property — indeed, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  121  See id. § 3.01, at 5–10. 
  122  See id.  This formal separation between the acts of the local government and the private 
union-employer agreement is significant for several reasons, as discussed below at section IV.C, 
pp. 1202–10. 
  123  See Complaint at 3, Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. Yale–New Haven Hosp., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-
01673-JCH (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2006) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (noting that 
Mayor De-Stefano acted as the “unofficial mediator” of the negotiations). 
  124  Kern Arbitration Award, supra note 98, at 2. 
  125  Id.; see also Affidavit of Ellen Dichner in Support of Plaintiffs’ Application for Preliminary 
Injunction at 1, Yale–New Haven Hospital, No 3:06-cv-01673-JCH (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library). 
  126  Kern Arbitration Award, supra note 98, at 2. 
  127  See New Haven Development Agreement, supra note 103. 
  128  The full agreement is available in Affidavit of Ellen Dichner in Support of Plaintiffs’ Appli-
cation for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 125, Exhibit A [hereinafter Election Principles 
Agreement]. 
  129  Kern Arbitration Award, supra note 98, at 2 (noting that the agreement was in effect from 
June 7, 2006 to March 7, 2007, and stating that it was “[f]ollowing issuance of those approvals in 
early June 2006[ that] the agreement went into effect”); see also Pickus Affidavit, supra note 98, at 
2 (stating that effective date of agreement was June 7, 2006). 
  130  See Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 879, 879–80 (1978).  Between seventy-
five and ninety-eight percent of employers in NRLB election campaigns do in fact hold one-on-
one meetings.  See Sachs, supra note 12, at 666 n.34. 
  131  Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 4. 
  132  The federal rule was announced in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992).  See 
generally Estlund, supra note 12 (arguing that Lechmere constituted an overly broad understand-
ing of a property owner’s general “right to exclude”).    
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the Agreement specified that the hospital would make available to the 
union a conference room for two-and-one-half hours each day for three 
days each week, and would provide union organizers access to the 
hospital atrium, cafeteria, break rooms, locker rooms, entrances, and 
parking lots.133  In addition, although the NLRB does not “probe into 
the truth or falsity of . . . parties’ campaign statements,” and will not 
overturn elections on the basis of “misleading” speech,134 both the hos-
pital and the union here committed to communicating with employees 
in a “factual manner” and to disseminating only “accurate and factual 
information about their respective positions.”135  Disputes regarding 
the conduct of the organizing campaign were to be submitted to a pri-
vate arbitrator selected by the parties, and the parties concomitantly 
agreed to waive their rights to have disputes resolved by the NLRB.136 
Accordingly, through a tripartite political exchange involving the 
City’s approval of the Yale–New Haven cancer center development 
plans, the hospital and the union redesigned the rules of organizing in 
an agreement with the force of federal labor law.  The New Haven 
case also appears to be one of several in which tripartite exchanges 
center on the development permitting process.  Another example is the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  133  Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 11. 
  134  Midland Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 133 (1982). 
  135  Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 5.  The agreement also prohib-
ited the parties from relying on “consultants or other representatives or surrogates to engage in 
activities inconsistent with the Agreement,” id. at 7, thus barring reliance on so-called anti-union 
consultants — a practice not only permitted but nearly pervasive in NLRA organizing campaigns.  
See GORDON LAFER, AM. RIGHTS AT WORK, NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR: THE SUBVERSION 
OF DEMOCRACY UNDER NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ELECTIONS app. at 42 tbl.2 
(2007) (reporting that employers rely on anti-union consultants in seventy-one to eighty-seven per-
cent of NLRA election campaigns); John Logan, Consultants, Lawyers, and the ‘Union Free’ 
Movement in the USA Since the 1970s, 33 INDUS. REL. J. 197, 198 (2002) (estimating that annual 
spending on anti-union consultants is approximately $200 million); John Logan, The Union 
Avoidance Industry in the United States, 44 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 651, 656 (2006).  
  136  Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 8–9.  The City’s involvement in 
the organizing process at Yale–New Haven did not end with the signing of the Election Proce-
dures Agreement and the grant of the development approvals.  When, during the union’s organiz-
ing campaign, the hospital violated the ban on consultants and one-on-one meetings contained in 
the Election Principles Agreement, Mayor DeStefano reinserted the City into the relationship be-
tween the union and the hospital.  He told the Hartford Courant, for example, that the “City gov-
ernment was misled . . . in this instance by hospital management that signed this agreement, got 
what it wanted and did exactly what we agreed would not be done.”  Kim Martineau, Unionizing 
Vote Called Off, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 15, 2006, at B1 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
When transcripts from an arbitration hearing — conducted pursuant to the agreement — showed 
that the hospital had engaged in anti-union conduct prohibited by the agreement, Mayor De-
Stefano told the New Haven Register that the “hospital is endangering the delivery of their own 
project,” and that he was “not inclined to be supportive of anything that enables the hospital 
when they are acting this way.”  Mary E. O’Leary, Mayor Rips into Y-NH, NEW HAVEN REG., 
Mar. 11, 2007 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Although Mayor DeStefano did not specify 
what type of support he might withhold, his statements were made at a time when city approvals 
were still required for the cancer center’s parking garage and office building.  See id.    
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Hollywood and Highland development in Los Angeles where, again, 
the city council tied its approval of the project to, among other things, 
the developer’s commitment to a card check and neutrality agreement 
for the workers who would staff the site’s new hotel.137  Although few-
er details are available, it also appears that the Los Angeles City 
Council’s approval of the Playa Vista Development was contingent 
upon the developer’s agreement to enter into a neutrality agreement 
for the service workers to be employed at the site.138 
2.  The California Alliance to Advance Nursing Home Care. — 
Across the last decades of the twentieth century, unionization of nurs-
ing home employees was a contentious business.139  Management 
fought unionization ferociously in these years, and nursing home   
unions had limited success organizing new workers through traditional 
NLRB election campaigns.140  California proved to be one of the pri-
mary battlegrounds, and the difficulties faced by unions nationally 
were also encountered by the Service Employees International Union, 
the largest union of nursing home employees in the state.141 
Across these same years, two primary problems concerned nursing 
home employers in California.  The nursing home industry there, like 
the nursing home industry nationally, receives a substantial portion of 
its revenue from the state’s Medicaid program  — known as Medi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  137  The Los Angeles Community Redevelopment Agency contributed $98 million to the Holly-
wood and Highland Project, but the funds went to finance the construction of the Kodak Theater 
and the nearby parking garage.  See Cooperation Agreement Between the Community Redeve-
lopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles and the City of Los Angeles, Hollywood and Highland 
1 (2002) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  Again, therefore, there is no plausible 
claim that the City had a proprietary interest in the unionization of the hotel workers.  Although, 
as in the New Haven Development Agreement, the Hollywood and Highland agreement made no 
mention of organizing rights, multiple accounts suggest the connection.  See, e.g., Greg Goldin, 
Mall-ywood, L.A. WKLY., Dec. 18, 1998, at 30 (“[Developers] agreed not to block unionization ef-
forts at their hotel.  Henceforth, Goldberg would become their biggest and most important boost-
er.”); Harold Meyerson, A Vision for the City, L.A. WKLY., Mar. 9, 2001, at 24 (“Progressive Coun-
cil Member Jackie Goldberg okayed the construction of the massive Hollywood & Highland 
project on the condition[] that the hotel on the site not oppose the efforts of its workers to form a 
union  .  .  .  .”).  Academic accounts of the project report the same arrangement.  See Scott L. 
Cummings & Steven A. Boutcher, Mobilizing Local Government Law for Low-Wage Workers, 2009 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 187, 205–06 (“In Los Angeles, [the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy] 
worked closely with Councilwoman Jackie Goldberg to incorporate a community benefits pack-
age — which included provisions for . . . card check neutrality . . . — into the 1998 development 
agreement for a large entertainment and retail project in Hollywood.”); Patricia E. Salkin & Amy 
Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., July 2008, at 
19, 22 (“[I]n exchange for community support, the developer offered to . . . implement . . . a policy 
of union neutrality.”). 
  138  See Bobbi Murray, Dream Deal, L.A. WKLY., May 28, 1999, at 20. 
  139  For an overview, see, for example, STEVEN HENRY LOPEZ, REORGANIZING THE RUST 
BELT: AN INSIDE STUDY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (2004). 
  140  See, e.g., Erin Johansson, Labor-Management Partnerships as a Means to Employer Neu-
trality 8 (Dec. 14, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  141  See, e.g., id.    
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Cal.142  Because Medi-Cal funding streams were crucial for the nurs-
ing home industry, reimbursement rates — that is, the rates at which 
nursing homes were paid to care for Medi-Cal eligible residents  — 
were a continual issue for the industry.143  The second source of con-
cern for California nursing homes throughout the 1990s and early 
2000s was the liability costs associated with medical malpractice 
claims.144  Thus, in 2002, the California Association of Health Facili-
ties (CAHF) reported that liability premiums for its members grew 
from approximately $300 per patient bed in 1999 to $1350 per bed in 
2002–2003, and predicted that costs would rise to $3000 per bed by 
2006.145  While the actual relationship between malpractice awards 
and liability insurance costs was contested,146 the nursing home indus-
try viewed malpractice lawsuits and state laws governing tort litigation 
as the primary culprits for rising costs.  It accordingly sought reforms 
that would cap tort damage awards and change the rules of evidence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  142  In California in 2001, for example, 68.8% of all “patient days” were accounted for by Medi-
Cal-funded residents.  See C HARLENE  HARRINGTON  ET  AL.,  IMPACT  OF  CALIFORNIA’S  
MEDI-CAL LONG TERM CARE REIMBURSEMENT ACT ON ACCESS, QUALITY AND COSTS 22 
tbl.1 ( 2008) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  That year, the Medi-Cal system 
funded over $2 billion in nursing home payments, or 57.1% of nursing home revenues.  See id. at 
27 tbl.4. 
  143  See id. at 1.  Medi-Cal reimbursement rates, of course, were also of great import to nursing 
home workers, as wage and staffing levels depended to a large degree on these reimbursement 
rates.  See id. at v (summarizing wage effects of changes in Medi-Cal reimbursement rates).  Prior 
to reforms enacted in 2005, nursing homes in California were reimbursed according to a flat fee 
payment system.  Under this system, reimbursement was set by a fee schedule, and if — as often 
was the case — the costs of care exceeded the approved fee, nursing homes were unable to recov-
er the difference.  See, e.g., id.; see also CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., CALIFORNIA’S NURSING 
HOMES: A SYSTEM IN TROUBLE 1 (2003), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/Files/PDF/ 
N/PDF%20NursingHomesFinanceIB.pdf.  According to one press account, a 2003 accounting 
report concluded that California nursing homes spent “an average of $6.66 more per day to care 
for Medi-Cal patients than they were paid by the state.”  Kathy Robertson, Bill Ensures Profit for 
Nursing Homes, SACRAMENTO BUS. J., Aug. 20, 2004, at 1.  In 2003, moreover, facing overall 
budget deficits, California proposed cutting Medi-Cal reimbursement rates by a full fifteen per-
cent.  See, e.g., Sandy Kleffman, Health Care Cuts Spark Objections, CONTRA COSTA TIMES 
(Cal.), Jan. 15, 2003, at A1.  The California Association of Health Facilities predicted that 300 to 
400 nursing homes would be bankrupted by the cuts.  See id. 
  144  See, e.g., HERBERT  J.  HOROWITZ  ET  AL.,  THE  FINANCIAL  HEALTH  OF  THE  CALI-
FORNIA  NURSING  HOME  INDUSTRY  31–32 ( 2006),  available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/ 
Files/PDF/N/PDF%20NursingHomesFinanceReport.pdf; Thomas Peele, $8 Million Crusade 
Eyed to Cut Elder-Care Suits, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Nov. 9, 2002, at A3; Nancy Weav-
er Teichert, California Nursing Homes Ask for Cap on Liability Awards, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
Feb. 18, 2003. 
  145  See HOROWITZ  ET  AL., supra note 144, at 31.  Similarly, a report commissioned by the 
American Health Care Association concluded that liability loss costs for long-term care providers 
in California (including nursing homes) rose from $970 per bed in 1995 to $2320 per bed in 2001.  
See id. 
  146  See, e.g., Peele, supra note 144.    
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in medical malpractice proceedings.147  In 2002, CAHF announced an 
$8 million lobbying effort designed to “limit lawsuit awards and re-
strict trial evidence.”148 
In December 2002, a coalition of eighteen nursing home employers 
and SEIU created an organization called the California Alliance   
to Advance Nursing Home Care, which came to be known simply   
as the California Alliance.149  The Alliance members then executed   
a contract — titled the “Agreement to Advance the Future of Nursing 
Home Care in California”150 — which contained a detailed set of rules 
for union organizing and collective bargaining that departed   
in substantial ways from the NLRA regime.151  The Agreement, how-
ever, made the implementation of these new rules conditional on sev-
eral legislative actions by the State of California.  Namely, the private-
ly negotiated organizing and bargaining process was to come   
into effect if, and only if, California enacted certain legislative   
reforms: first, amendments to the Medi-Cal reimbursement regime   
that would “substantially increase funding” and ensure nursing homes 
a  “guaranteed . . . rate  of  return”;152 and, second, a “package of 
tort . . . reforms.”153  The Agreement styled these reforms as “bench-
marks”: if a benchmark was achieved — if the legislature enacted the 
parties’ specified reform — the organizing and bargaining agreement 
would go into effect for a predetermined number of nursing homes op-
erated by the signatory employers.154 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  147  In  1975, California had capped noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits at 
$250,000.  See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 3333.1–.2 (Deering 2005).  But a 1991 state statute, the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civ-
il Protection Act (EADACPA), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 15600–15660 (Deering 2006), and a 
set of state court decisions interpreting EADACPA, removed nursing homes from MICRA’s pro-
tection.  See Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court, 86 P.3d 290 (Cal. 2004); Delaney v. Baker, 971 
P.2d 986 (Cal. 1999). 
  148  Peele, supra note 144. 
  149  See Agreement to Advance the Future of Nursing Home Care in California 19 app. B (Feb. 
6, 2004) [hereinafter California Alliance Agreement], available at http://www.consumerwatchdog. 
org/resources/AgreementAdvanceNHCareCA.pdf. 
  150  Id. at 3 (noting that the original Agreement was signed on December 9, 2002).  Brudney 
makes reference to this agreement.  Brudney, supra note 7, at 838 n.83. 
  151  See California Alliance Agreement, supra note 149, at 43 app. C (“Neutrality in Organizing 
Agreement”). 
  152  Id. at 6. 
  153  Id.  The Agreement did not define tort reform with specificity.  For a discussion, see infra  
p. 1185. 
  154  See California Alliance Agreement, supra note 149, at 6–8.  There were several other “inte-
rim” benchmarks included in the Agreement, which the parties were to seek while attempting to 
secure broader Medi-Cal rate reform.  See id. at 7.  Interim benchmarks included “the 2004–2005 
SNF [Skilled Nursing Facility] Medi-Cal rate not being reduced from where it is presently fro-
zen,” “increasing the frozen 2004–2005 SNF Medi-Cal rate by a statewide average of at least 3%,” 
and “California’s government officially submitting a provider tax funding plan to CMS [Congres-
sional Medicaid Service] that was approved in final form by a binding vote of the LMC Board.”  
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With respect to both Medi-Cal rate reform and tort reform, the po-
litical calculus underlying the Alliance Agreement was straightfor-
ward.  The nursing home industry had support from Republicans in 
the state legislature, but, particularly given Democratic control of the 
statehouse, the industry did not have sufficient political support to se-
cure passage of either piece of legislation on its own.155  Indeed, past 
efforts by the nursing home industry to secure rate reform and tort 
reform legislation had been unsuccessful.156  The union, however, had 
wide support from Democratic lawmakers, and SEIU was considered 
among the strongest organizations in state Democratic politics at the 
time.157  In the view of the Alliance employers, then, achieving Medi-
Cal and tort reform required SEIU’s political strength. 
After executing the Alliance Agreement, the parties sought to se-
cure enactment of the legislative reforms contained in the Agreement’s 
benchmarks.  The first campaign was for Medi-Cal rate reform, and it 
was a successful one.  The Alliance drafted legislation that became As-
sembly Bill 1629 and secured its introduction in the legislature.158  As 
called for in the Alliance Agreement, the bill proposed substantial 
changes to the reimbursement process for nursing home care.159  Sig-
nificantly, the legislation provided for an “operating allocation,” which 
had originally been named a “rate of return,” in accordance with the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Id. at 8.  It appears that all of these benchmarks were met.  See SEIU UNITED HEALTHCARE 
WORKERS  W.,  BUILDING  A  NATIONAL  HEALTHCARE  WORKERS’  MOVEMENT  13 ( 2006), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/seiuvoice.org/downloads/UHW_paper_on_Building_a_ 
National_Healthcare_Workers_Movement_4-22-06.pdf (“We  .  .  .  fought off proposed Medi-Cal 
cuts of 15%, even winning a COLA . . . .”); Email from Beverly A. Boston, Special Assistant to 
the Grp. Dir., Ctr. for Medicaid & State Operations, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. to au-
thor (Mar. 2, 2010, 17:26:39 EST) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (confirming that 
California submitted a provider tax funding plan in 2005 and that the plan was approved by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services). 
  155  See, e.g., Johansson, supra note 140, at 9. 
  156  See id. 
  157  On SEIU’s political strength in California, see, for example, Ruth Milkman & Daisy Rooks, 
California Union Membership: A Turn-of-the-Century Portrait, in UNIV. OF CAL. INST. FOR LA-
BOR AND EMP’T, THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA LABOR (2003), available at http://escholarship. 
org/uc/item/94x791km; and Harold Meyerson, California’s Progressive Mosaic, AM. PROSPECT, 
June 18, 2001, at 17, 22.  See also Morning Edition: Powerful Interest Groups Target California 
Budget Deal (NPR radio broadcast July 22,  2009),  available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=106876626 (reporting that SEIU is one of the most powerful interest 
groups in California politics). 
  158  According to the California Senate Health and Human Services Committee report, “In July 
2003, SEIU submitted a revised proposal jointly with a group of nursing home providers who had 
joined with SEIU to form an Alliance to reform nursing homes.  The proposal contained in AB 
1629 is based on the actual cost of providing care . . . .”  S. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Commit-
tee Analysis, A.B. 1619, 2003–2004 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) [hereinafter HHS Committee Analysis]. 
  159  In place of the previous flat-fee payment system, the new legislation created a cost-based 
reimbursement regime.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14126.021 (Deering 2006); see also HAR-
RINGTON ET AL., supra note 142, at 1.    
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Alliance Agreement’s benchmark.160  The legislation, accordingly, 
would ensure that nursing homes earned a five percent rate of return 
on all Medi-Cal funded residents.161 
After the bill was introduced, the Alliance members pressed for its 
enactment.162  In addition to engaging in traditional lobbying activi-
ties, the union mobilized thousands of members to push the legislation 
publicly.163  The union and nursing home employers also jointly coor-
dinated protest activities involving nursing home residents as a “call 
[to] state legislators to pass” Assembly Bill 1629.164  And indeed, by the 
fall of 2004, the employers’ political calculus had proved correct: the 
Medi-Cal Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act165 became law, and the 
Alliance’s support and lobbying efforts were widely credited with en-
suring the legislation’s passage.166  A s t h e  San Diego Union-Tribune 
reported, “State lawmakers approved the  .  .  .  payment system in the 
closing days of their 2004 session with support from the nursing home 
industry and the Service Employees International Union . . . .”167 
Enactment of the Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act satisfied 
the Alliance Agreement’s first legislative benchmark: the Act had the 
effect of substantially increasing funding while also providing employ-
ers a guaranteed rate of return.168  Thus, when California enacted the 
legislation, the Agreement’s private organizing and bargaining rules 
went into effect at Alliance nursing home facilities.  Under the Agree-
ment, employers were required to remain entirely “neutral” on the 
question of unionization and to avoid all interventions into employee 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  160  See HHS Committee Analysis, supra note 158.  Under this provision of the law, nursing 
homes were to be reimbursed, in addition to their actual operating expenses, an amount equal to 
five percent of total Medi-Cal costs.  See W ELF.  &  INST.  § 14126.023(c)(3); HHS Committee 
Analysis, supra note 158; HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 142, at 1. 
  161  See Robertson, supra note 143 (“Assembly Bill 1629 also would assure operators of receiving 
annual nursing home profits of 5 percent . . . .”). 
  162  See id.; see also Matt Smith, Gutted, S.F. WKLY., Aug. 25, 2004. 
  163  See, e.g., Statewide Coalition, Assembly Majority Leader Dario Frommer to Call on Gover-
nor: Keep Nursing Home Funding Reform Moving Forward to Protect Seniors!, PR NEWSWIRE, 
May 17, 2005; see also SEIU United Healthcare Workers-West, The California Alliance Agree-
ment: Lessons Learned in Moving Forward in Organizing California’s Nursing Home Industry 1 
(Jan. 4, 2007) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  164  San Jose Nursing Homes Protest Underfunding, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug.  10, 2004; see also 
Smith, supra note 162. 
  165  Medi-Cal Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act, ch. 875, 2004 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West) (codi-
fied in scattered sections of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE). 
  166  See, e.g., Kathy Robertson, Study: Nursing Homes Not Improving, SACRAMENTO BUS. J., 
Apr. 18, 2008 (reporting that SEIU “collaborated with nursing home companies to get the funding 
bill signed in 2004”). 
  167  Keith Darcé, Who Benefited Most from Higher Medi-Cal Payments?, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Apr. 11, 2008, at C1. 
  168  A 2008 study concluded that nursing home operating margins increased by 747% between 
2004 and 2006.  HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 142, at vi.    
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organizing efforts.169  Specifically, the Agreement required that the 
employer “take all reasonable steps to insure that its . . . managers, su-
pervisors, and other agents . . . do not attempt to influence employees’ 
choice in any manner.”170  In lieu of an NLRB election, workers cov-
ered by the Agreement were to express their preferences on the union 
question either through a card check process or through a privately 
run secret ballot election, conducted according to rules and procedures 
established by the parties.171  And, unlike the NLRA rules that pro-
vide union organizers no access to company property, the Alliance 
Agreement dictated that the employer must grant union organizers 
“reasonable access to non-working areas of [its] facilities  .  .  .  for the 
purpose of allowing them to communicate with employees.”172 
In addition to these organizing rules, the Alliance Agreement also 
changed the way collective bargaining was to proceed in the event that 
workers in a covered nursing home chose to unionize.  In another de-
parture from the federal regime, the Alliance Agreement established an 
interest arbitration procedure for first contract bargaining.  Under this 
provision, if the parties did not reach “complete agreement” on all of 
the terms for the first contract of a newly unionized facility within ni-
nety days of the first bargaining session, “unresolved issues” were to be 
submitted to an arbitrator for resolution.173 
The Agreement’s other legislative benchmark was the state legisla-
ture’s enactment of a “mutually-agreed upon package of tort and regu-
latory reforms.”174  The Agreement did not specify the types of reforms 
that would satisfy the benchmark, and there is no record of the specific 
reforms upon which the Alliance members mutually agreed.  It is clear, 
however, that the Alliance sought to secure tort reform in California.  
One union spokesperson, for example, stated that the current tort sys-
tem was “an issue that constrains resources . . . [and]  has  to  be 
tackled,”175 and that “SEIU has helped the industry support tort 
reform.”176  Nonetheless, the Alliance ultimately abandoned its efforts 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  169  See California Alliance Agreement, supra note 149, at 43. 
  170  Id. at 45. 
  171  Id. at 46.  Under the card check option, no election is held.  Instead, “the Union shall be 
considered the representative of the bargaining unit if it acquires the signatures of more than 50% 
of the employees . . . on valid authorization cards.”  Id. 
  172  Id.  The Agreement goes on to define reasonable access: “‘Reasonable access to non-working 
areas within the facility’ is intended to mean that union representatives may be in those areas for 
up to two (2) hours each day during the day and evening shifts and one (1) hour during the night 
shift.”  Id. 
  173  Id. at 48. 
  174  Id. at 6. 
  175  Kathy Robertson, Deal Between Union, Industry Could Pave Way for Tort Reform, SAC-
RAMENTO BUS. J., Aug. 20, 2004. 
  176  Matt Smith, Partners in Slime, S.F. WKLY., June 30, 2004.    
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to secure legislative enactment of these reforms.177  Because the state 
did not enact a “mutually-agreed upon package of tort reforms,” the 
Agreement’s organizing and bargaining rules were not extended to ad-
ditional nursing home facilities. 
In sum, then, through a tripartite political exchange — this one in-
volving state Medicaid rules — nursing home employers and the nurs-
ing home workers’ union redesigned the rules of organizing and bar-
gaining in an Agreement with the force of federal law.178  T h e  
California union–nursing home alliance, moreover, became a model 
replicated in other states, including Washington and Oregon.179  As in 
California, Washington nursing home employers viewed the state’s 
Medicaid payment rates as inadequate,180 yet lacked the ability to se-
cure increases in Medicaid funding without support from Democratic 
legislators.181  Accordingly, in 2005, six nursing home chains and SEIU 
Local 775 established Washington United for Quality Nursing Home 
Care.182  The Washington alliance agreement tied the implementation 
of new organizing and bargaining rules to the enactment of state Me-
dicaid legislation increasing reimbursements to nursing homes.183  And 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  177  See, e.g., William Johnson, Deserting the Sick and Elderly, Some Unions Join Employers 
Seeking to Limit Lawsuits, LABOR NOTES, Sept. 2004, at 3 (quoting SEIU spokesperson as stat-
ing that tort reform was “off the table” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  178  An early, though smaller-scale, experiment with an Alliance-type agreement came in 1995 in 
Massachusetts.  See Creating a New Partnership (Dec. 14, 1995) (on file with the Harvard Law 
School Library) (agreement between SEIU Local 509 and the Cooperative for Human Services, 
Renaissance Club, Inc., Better Community Living, Inc., and Cambridge and Somerville Coopera-
tive Apartment Project, Inc.); see also James Green, Improving Workforce Conditions in Private 
Human Services Agencies: A Partnership Between a Union and Human Service Providers, 13 
NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 187, 193 (1997) (“If the employers remained neutral, the union could 
help lobby the government . . . .”); cf. Brudney, supra note 7, at 837. 
  179  Because less information is available about the Oregon agreement, I do not discuss it here.  
For the parts of the Washington agreement that are available, see Agreement to Advance the Fu-
ture of Nursing Home Care in Washington (Jan. 19,  2006) [hereinafter Washington Alliance 
Agreement],  available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/AgreementAdvanceNH 
CareWA.pdf.  For the parts of the Oregon agreement that are available, see Alliance Agreement 
Between SEIU Local 503 and Oregon Nursing Home Signatories (July 6,  2006),  available at 
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/AgreementAdvanceNHCareWA.pdf. 
  180  See Ralph Thomas, U n i o n ,  N u r s i n g  H o m e  A l l i a n c e  T e a m  U p , SEATTLE  TIMES (Mar.   
20,  2007,  3:03 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003601276_seiu05m.html 
(“[N]ursing-home operators say the Medicaid payment rates set by the Legislature fall far short of 
actual costs.”). 
  181  See id. (quoting nursing home CEO as stating “[w]e’ve been very unsuccessful in getting 
adequate reimbursement from the Legislature”). 
  182  See id.  A complete copy of the Washington United for Quality Nursing Home Care agree-
ment has not been made available publicly.  The several pages that are available make clear that 
the structure of the Washington agreement mirrored that of the California one.  See Washington 
Alliance Agreement, supra note 179.  Thus, the agreement is structured according to “bench-
marks,” id. at 3, and contains a neutrality agreement, see id. at 2 (table of contents). 
  183  See Thomas, supra note 180.    
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with SEIU’s political support,184 the effort was again successful: the 
state legislature passed a $10 million Medicaid reimbursement increase 
for nursing homes, which “the union and operators had set as their 
‘Phase I’ goal in the agreement.”185  With the legislative benchmark 
achieved, the agreement’s organizing and bargaining rules went into 
effect at alliance nursing homes.186 
3.  The Communications Workers of America and the SBC-PacTel 
Merger. — The next example involves the Communications Workers of 
America (CWA) — the largest union of telecommunications workers  
in the United States187 — and Pacific Telesis Group (PacTel).  Prior to 
the breakup of the Bell system in the early 1980s, the union 
represented approximately 650,000 employees of the major telephone 
companies.188  In the post-divestiture period, however, the union began 
to suffer huge membership losses.189  Traditional organizing campaigns 
conducted under NLRA rules were largely unsuccessful.  Between 
1985 and 1997, CWA added a mere 6104 members through these 
drives.190  Accordingly, beginning in the 1990s, the union actively 
sought alternatives to the NLRA’s organizing rules.  For the telephone 
industry, the 1990s were an era that called for reconsolidation, and the 
Regional Bell Operating Companies — which had emerged from the 
breakup of the Bell system — actively sought merger approvals from 
state public utilities commissions.191 
An illustrative example came in the middle of the decade when 
Southwestern Bell Company (SBC) sought to acquire PacTel in a mer-
ger that required approval by the California Public Utilities Commis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  184  Again, SEIU engaged not only in traditional lobbying activity, but also in public demonstra-
tions designed to push the Medicaid legislation.  The union held a rally in February 2007, see 
Thomas, supra note 180, and union members met with state legislators during “Purple Presence” 
and “Lobby Day,” see  What Do the Budget Cuts Mean for Home Care in Washington State?, 
SEIU HEALTHCARE 775NW, http://www.seiu775.org/issuesandaction/wa/What_do_the_budget_ 
cuts_mean_for_home_care_in_Washington_State_.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2011).  As one Wash-
ington nursing home employer stated, “SEIU provided the experience, contacts and media savvy 
that those of us in long-term health care simply didn’t have.”  Dan Richman, Union Struggles 
Evolving, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 4, 2006, at D1. 
  185  Thomas, supra note 180. 
  186  The specific organizing and bargaining rules are unavailable.  The agreement’s table of con-
tents, which is available, refers to an employer neutrality commitment.  See Washington Alliance 
Agreement, supra note 179, at 2.  Press accounts state that the employer members of the Washing-
ton alliance “bless[ed] the union’s organizing efforts,” Thomas, supra note 180, and that the em-
ployers “let[] the union organize workers,” Richman, supra note 184. 
  187  See  About CWA, COMMC’NS  WORKERS  OF  AM., http://www.cwa-union.org/pages/ 
about_cwa (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
  188  Katz, Batt & Keefe, supra note 7, at 576. 
  189  See id. 
  190  Id. at 580 tbl.2. 
  191  Id. at 577,  579;  see also C OMMC’NS  WORKERS  OF  AM., CWA  AT  SOUTHWESTERN 
BELL: FIVE YEARS TO CARD CHECK (1997).    
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sion (CPUC) and the Nevada Public Service Commission (NPSC).192  
District 9 of the CWA, which represented PacTel employees in Cali-
fornia, originally opposed the merger.193  In the summer of 1996, how-
ever, after CWA filed notices of opposition with the California and 
Nevada utilities commissions, representatives from the union met with 
PacTel and SBC in Phoenix, Arizona.  At this meeting, SBC agreed 
that if CWA would support SBC’s merger with PacTel, the company 
would consent to a card check and neutrality organizing process for 
PacTel workers in California and Nevada.194  
Following the Phoenix meeting, CWA reversed its position on the 
SBC-PacTel merger in both California and Nevada.  In California, the 
union filed a letter with the CPUC in which it “withdr[ew] its opposi-
tion to the merger, and stat[ed] that CWA ha[d] decided to fully sup-
port the merger application.”195  Then, in March 1997, CWA District 9 
Vice President Tony Bixler sent letters to each of the CPUC Commis-
sioners in which he expressed CWA’s position that the proposed mer-
ger was “fair and reasonable to employees.”196  Similarly, on March 24, 
Bixler met directly with three of the five CPUC Commissioners, again 
to state that “CWA had opposed the merger but has come to support it 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  192  See Pac. Telesis Grp., 71 C.P.U.C. 2d 351 (1997); Petition for Leave to Intervene, Joint Ap-
plication of Pac. Telesis Grp. & SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 96-5036 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nev. June 
25, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); see also C OMMC’NS WORKERS  OF 
AM., supra note 191, at 20; Katz, Batt & Keefe, supra note 7, at 587.  Brudney and Hartley refer-
ence other instances in which CWA intervened in local regulatory processes to achieve organizing 
goals.  See Brudney, supra note 7, at 838 n.84; Hartley, supra note 7, at 391. 
  193  See Prehearing Conference Statement of Communications Workers of America, Joint Appli-
cation of Pac. Telesis Grp. & SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 96-04-038 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n June 
13, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library); Petition for Leave to Intervene, supra 
note 192. 
  194  See COMMC’NS WORKERS OF AM., supra note 191, at 20–21; Telephone Interview with 
CWA Official (Nov. 25, 2009).  Representatives from CWA Region 6, which represented SBC em-
ployees, also attended.  See id. 
  195  Pac. Telesis Grp., 71 C.P.U.C. at 361. 
  196  See Augmented Notice of Ex Parte Communications, Joint Application of Pac. Telesis Grp. 
& SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 96-04-038 (Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 21, 1997) (on file with the 
Harvard Law School Library) (reproducing letters from Tony Bixler to Commissioners Bilas, 
Knight, Conlon, and Duque).  At the time CWA sent these letters, two CPUC administrative law 
judges had recommended that the merger be approved, but conditioned that recommendation on 
a requirement that Pacific Bell refund $590.5 million to ratepayers.  See Quickly Accepting Con-
ciliatory California PUC Terms, SBC, Pacific Telesis Close on $16.5 Billion Merger, TR DAILY,  
Apr. 1, 1997.  The original refund condition had been rejected by SBC and PacTel as prohibitive 
of the merger.  See id.  As such, CWA’s involvement at this point in the proceedings took the form 
of support for the merger and opposition to the $590.5 million refund condition.  See Letter from 
Tony Bixler, Vice President, CWA Dist. 9, to Richard A. Bilas, Comm’r, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n 
2 (Mar. 13, 1997), in Augmented Notice of Ex Parte Communications, supra (“CWA supports the 
SBC-Pacific Telesis merger . . . [and] [w]e urge the Commission to mitigate what we see as the 
more punitive aspects of the ALJs’ Proposed Decision.”); id. (“[T]he enormous size of the ordered 
customer rate reductions is very troubling.”).    
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as good for employees” in California.197  The CPUC approved   
the SBC-PacTel merger on March 31, 1997.198  Events followed a simi-
lar course in Nevada, with the NPSC approving the merger on De-
cember 31, 1996.199 
In accordance with the agreement reached in Phoenix, PacTel and 
CWA entered into a card check and neutrality agreement in April 
1997.200  Although the language of the CWA-PacTel agreement is not 
available, according to the union a “similar agreement” was signed be-
tween CWA and SBC for employees in Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, 
Oklahoma, and Texas in March 1997.201  Under that agreement, SBC 
agreed to provide CWA with lists of eligible employees and access to 
company property,202 and to recognize the union based on a card 
check.203  With respect to conduct during organizing campaigns, the 
agreement required the employer to “remain neutral and  .  .  .  neither 
assist nor hinder the Union on the issue of Union representation.”204 
4.  A Note on Gamesa Corporation. — Although far fewer details 
are available, a final — if partial — example comes from the man-
ufacturing sector and an agreement between the United Steelworkers  
of America (USWA) and the Gamesa Corporation.  Between 2004  
and 2006, Gamesa — the world’s second-largest wind energy compa-
ny205 — opened two production facilities in Pennsylvania.206  Much 
has been written about Gamesa’s motivation to locate in Pennsylvania, 
but press accounts focus on state legislation requiring that eighteen 
percent of Pennsylvania’s electricity come from alternative energy 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  197  Docket Sheet, Document # 970310622, Joint Application of Pac. Telesis Grp. & SBC 
Commc’ns, Inc., No. 96-04-038 (Mar. 25, 1997) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) 
(reporting that “[o]n 3/24/97, Tony Bixler, CWA, met with Cmmrs. Knight, Neeper, and Duque in 
separate meetings in SF”). 
  198  See Pac. Telesis Grp., 71 C.P.U.C. at 360; see also Quickly Accepting Conciliatory California 
PUC Terms, supra note 196.  The CPUC not only approved the merger one week after Bixler vis-
ited with Commission members, but also cut by more than half the amount that SBC was re-
quired to refund to ratepayers.  See id. 
  199  See Order, Joint Application of Pac. Telesis Grp. & SBC Commc’ns, Inc., No. 96-5036 (Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n Nev. Dec. 31, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). 
  200  See COMMC’NS WORKERS OF AM., supra note 191, at 22. 
  201  See id.  The Memorandum of Agreement is available at id. at 24 app. [hereinafter SBC-
CWA Memorandum of Agreement]. 
  202  See SBC-CWA Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 201, ¶¶ 3(a)–(b), at 24. 
  203  See id. ¶¶ 3(d)–(e), at 25. 
  204  Id. ¶ 4(a), at 25. 
  205  See Joan Fitzgerald, Getting Serious About Good Jobs, AM.  PROSPECT,  Nov.  2006,  
at 33, 36. 
  206  See  id.; Jim Grossfeld, Leo the Linchpin, AM.  PROSPECT, Oct. 2007, at 34,  36;  Mischa 
Gaus,  Getting Detroit Back to Work, LABOR  NOTES  (May  15,  2009,  8:24 AM), 
http://www.labornotes.org/node/2252 (“The Spanish wind-turbine manufacturer [Gamesa] moved 
into the shell of the old U.S. Steel Fairless Works outside of Philadelphia . . . .”).    
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sources (like wind power) by 2020207  — legislation that essentially 
“create[d] a market” for Gamesa’s product.208  Part of the story of   
how and why Gamesa located in Pennsylvania, however, involves the  
USWA and the influence that union had in state politics generally and 
with Governor Ed Rendell in particular.  Although little is known 
about this part of the Gamesa story, one press account describes the 
role played by the USWA this way: “The Steelworkers union traded 
political support for the governor for his help in retooling the ‘brown 
belt’ of abandoned factories dotting the state.”209  Another, reporting 
on the influence of USWA president Leo Gerard, described the USWA 
role this way: 
Though Gerard demurs from taking credit for Gamesa, it’s no secret that 
what helped clinch the deal was the state’s commitment to have 18 per-
cent of Pennsylvania’s electricity come from clean technologies by 2020.  
That commitment wouldn’t have happened without the support of the 
USW.  Perhaps the best measure of the Steelworkers’ role in helping Ga-
mesa settle in Pennsylvania is the fact that the company did everything 
but roll out a red carpet when the union’s organizers came to call.210 
Indeed, when Gamesa agreed to locate in Pennsylvania, it also 
agreed to replace the NLRA’s organizing rules with private ones, in-
cluding a card check recognition process and employer neutrality.211 
B. The Government’s Role 
In each of the instances described above, organizing and bargaining 
rules were redesigned through a political process in which local gov-
ernments, unions, and employers played a role.  In each example, state 
and local government actions in areas of law unrelated to labor were 
exchanged for private compacts through which unions and employers 
adopted alternatives to the NLRA rules.  Although these are unifying 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  207  The Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act is codified at 73 P A. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 1648.1–.8 (West 2008).  For press accounts, see, for example, Brad Bumsted, Analysis: Rendell 
Future Might Be in Wind, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Apr. 4, 2007; Allison M. Heinrichs, Grow-
ing Pains Ahead as State Develops Wind Power, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Aug. 3, 2008; Jim 
McKay,  What’s the Alternative?,  PITTSBURGH  POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 23,  2005, at K-1; Paula 
Reed Ward, Windmills to Power Cambria County Economy, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 
15, 2005, at A-9. 
  208  Fitzgerald, supra note 205, at 37. 
  209  Gaus, supra note 206. 
  210  Grossfeld, supra note 206, at 36. 
  211  See, e.g.,  Gamesa Technology Corporation, Inc., AM.  RIGHTS  AT  WORK, http://www. 
americanrightsatwork.org/labor-day-list/2008-companies/gamesa-technology-corporation-inc-2008 
0819-623-365-365.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (“Known for its progressive relationships with 
European labor unions, it was a logical decision for the company to embrace a neutrality agree-
ment and voluntarily recognize the decision of a majority of its employees to choose union   
representation.”).  As one report concluded, “Gamesa’s investment netted the union not just 
jobs . . . but a card check recognition agreement covering its 600 workers.”  Gaus, supra note 206.    
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features of this form of labor lawmaking, the government’s role varies 
across the different examples.  More specifically, the reasons for the 
government’s action are clearer in some forms of tripartite lawmaking 
than in others. 
In the New Haven Cancer Center agreement, the local government, 
the union, and the employer engaged in tripartite negotiations, and the 
government’s actions were quite clearly tied to union-employer agree-
ment on organizing rules: the local government acted, at least in part, 
because its actions had the effect of reordering the rules of organizing 
and bargaining.  But in other instances, the reasons for the govern-
ment’s actions are less clear.  In the California Alliance and the CWA-
PacTel agreements, for example, the state governments acted in areas 
of law with no ostensible connection to labor policy, and without any 
signal that labor policy motivated their decisions.  While the unions 
and employers clearly reordered their organizing rules because of the 
governmental actions, it is less clear whether the governments acted 
because their actions would have this effect.  Thus, while all cases of 
tripartism depend upon the public acts of local governments, determin-
ing whether local governments are acting in nonlabor areas of law be-
cause their decisions contribute to the reordering of union organizing 
and bargaining rules will clarify the local governments’ role. 
Part V takes up the question of whether inquiring into governmen-
tal motive might be an appropriate means of enhancing labor preemp-
tion doctrine.  This section, however, merely examines whether the 
reordering of organizing and bargaining rules is a but-for motivation 
for the state and local government action.  Although such inquiries are 
notoriously fraught endeavors,212 then-Professor Elena Kagan has   
offered a way to approach the but-for inquiry into legislative motive 
that is appropriate here.213  As Kagan explains, determining “whether 
a particular factor played a but-for role in a [legislative] decision-
making process” requires “reckoning how many legislators the [rele-
vant] consideration swayed and comparing that number to the margin 
of victory.”214 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  212  Determining legislative intent raises a host of problems.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 558 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring 
in the judgment) (“[I]t is virtually impossible to determine the singular ‘motive’ of a collective leg-
islative body . . . .”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional 
Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1286 (2006) (“A multimember body such as a legislature has no 
unitary intent, critics emphasize, and they therefore regard the search for legislative intent as un-
intelligible.”); Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 861 (“[L]egislators 
are likely to hide bad legislative intent and it often will be difficult to ferret it out from committee 
reports and other usual tools of legislative history.”).  See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress 
Is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
  213  See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 439 (1996). 
  214  Id. at 439–40.    
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In our context, we cannot make this assessment by examining   
either the government enactments themselves or their legislative   
histories.215  Indeed, such an examination would reveal nothing about 
whether labor policy concerns swayed a sufficient number — or any 
number — of decisionmakers.  Nonetheless, the union-employer 
agreements on organizing and bargaining rules offer a promising proxy 
for legislative motive.  With these private agreements, employers have 
accepted rules that make it distinctly more likely that unions will suc-
ceed in organizing their employees.  The employers have acceded to 
such changes because, by doing so, they ensure the union’s political 
cooperation in securing some employer-favorable state or local gov-
ernment action.216  Two sets of conclusions are thus implicit in em-
ployers’ decisions to enter into these agreements: First, the employers 
believe that absent their consent to new organizing and bargaining 
rules the union would not exert its political influence in the manner 
called for by the agreement.  Second, the employers believe that if the 
union exerts its political influence in the manner called for by the 
agreement, a sufficient number of government decisionmakers will be 
swayed to support the employers’ position.  In short, then, the private 
agreements reflect the employers’ belief that injecting labor policy 
concerns into the relevant governmental process will sway enough de-
cisionmakers to change the outcome.  If this were not true, the em-
ployers would have no clear incentive to accept the alternative rules of 
organizing and bargaining. 
Of course, the employers in any of these cases might be mistaken, 
and using their assessment of the political balance of power in a city or 
state is not a perfect mechanism for determining a but-for cause of  
governmental action.  But, in each instance of tripartite labor lawmak-
ing, sophisticated employers, with long experience trying to achieve po-
litical goals in these jurisdictions, determined that the outcomes they 
desired depended on union assistance, and that union assistance de-
pended on the private reordering of the rules of organizing and bar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  215  Kagan admits that many of the same problems of proof that attend the standard intent in-
quiry plague the but-for inquiry as well.  It is unlikely, for example, that many legislators will 
state publicly that they are voting for invalid purposes, and legislators may mask their genuine 
motivations with statements evincing a contrary purpose.  Id. at 440; see also Hasen, supra note 
212, at 861.  Rather than abandoning the motive inquiry, however, Kagan proposes a proxy for 
legislative history–type evidence: Kagan argues that motive should be determined “obliquely” by 
looking at the terms of the legislation itself.  Kagan, supra note 213, at 441.  Unlike Kagan, we 
cannot rely on the terms of the state and local actions themselves in order to determine motive.  
Looking at the New Haven development agreement or the orders approving the SBC-PacTel 
merger, for example, would reveal nothing about whether labor policy concerns underlay the gov-
ernments’ actions.  As discussed immediately below, however, we do have a different proxy that, 
though imperfect, provides us with a pragmatic means to assess governmental motive. 
  216  See, e.g.,  supra pp. 1182–83  (describing the political calculus in the California Alliance 
Agreement).    
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gaining.  If these assessments are correct, there is a reasonable basis to 
conclude that the effects on labor were a but-for cause of local gov-
ernments’ nonlabor actions.217 
C.  Some Partial Analogues 
While certain features of tripartite lawmaking may be unique to 
our setting, partial analogues can be found in other modes of govern-
ance.  Before turning to examine the implications of tripartism and 
possible responses to it, a consideration of these analogues will help 
complete the descriptive picture of tripartite lawmaking. 
  Perhaps the closest example is “neo-corporatism.”218  In general 
terms, under neo-corporatism, public policy is developed through co-
operative negotiation between interest organizations and the state.219  
Because there are generally three key players in these systems of gov-
ernance — labor, employers, and the government — the systems are 
often called “tripartite corporatism” or “tripartism.”220  Sweden pro-
vides the classic iteration.  As Professor Jonas Pontusson has ex-
plained, postwar lawmaking in Sweden involved a “political ex-
change”: Swedish unions agreed to moderate the wage demands they 
made in collective negotiations with employers in exchange for gov-
ernmental action on labor market policies; the government, in turn, 
went forward with its labor market policies based on the commitment 
to restrained collective bargaining demands.221  Thus, according to a 
standard formulation of the Swedish tripartite model: “At the same 
time as it assigned pivotal importance to wage bargaining as a means 
to promote income equalization and structural change, the model spec-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  217  It is also possible that, in some cases, a but-for cause of government action is the union’s 
political demands generally, irrespective of the reasons behind the union’s demands.  That is, state 
or city legislators might act simply because the union movement presses them to do so, and might 
never be aware — or may not care — that a union is pressing for government action because of a 
private agreement on organizing rights.  Where this is the case, the state and local government 
has a less specific motive for participating in tripartite labor lawmaking: a but-for motive of its 
participation is support for the labor movement’s agenda writ large, not support specifically for 
new rules of organizing and bargaining.  Nonetheless, even in these instances, the government 
acts because of the union’s political intervention, and the union intervenes because of the private 
agreement on organizing rights.  As such, the reordering of organizing rules continues to play a 
“but-for role in a [legislative] decision-making process.”  Kagan, supra note 213, at 439–40. 
  218  See Lucio Baccaro, What Is Alive and What Is Dead in the Theory of Corporatism,  41 
BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 683, 683–85 (2003). 
  219  See  Gerhard Lehmbruch, Liberal Corporatism and Party Government,  10 C OMP.  POL. 
STUD. 91, 93–95 (1977). 
  220  See, e.g., Jonas Pontusson, Labor, Corporatism, and Industrial Policy: The Swedish Case in 
Comparative Perspective, 23 COMP. POL. 163, 163, 168 (1991). 
  221  Id. at 168.    
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ified very clearly the kinds of policies that the government had to pur-
sue in order for the unions to be able to assume this role.”222 
Professor Lucio Baccaro identifies several contemporary variants of 
the neo-corporatist policy-making process, which he refers to as “con-
certation.”223  He explains, for example, that economic policy in Ire-
land since the 1980s has been shaped by “social partnership agree-
ments between government, unions and employers”224 in which unions 
committed to restrain collective bargaining demands in exchange for 
the government’s commitment to provide tax cuts and social welfare 
benefits.225  Similarly, in 2002, the Italian government, the Italian na-
tional employer association, and two major union confederations nego-
tiated the “Pact for Italy,” in which the unions accepted the employers’ 
demand for more flexible discharge rules in exchange for the govern-
ment’s commitment to reduce taxes.226 
There are obvious differences between tripartite corporatism and 
concertation, on the one hand, and the model of tripartite lawmaking 
described here.  Most obviously, the neo-corporatist or concertationist 
state need not act in a nonlabor area of law in order to effect labor pol-
icy; instead, the state acts directly on labor, economic, and welfare   
policy in exchange for union restraint in collective bargaining.  More-
over, the union-employer agreements involved in neo-corporatism are 
classic collective bargaining agreements  — setting wages and other 
terms of employment  — rather than negotiated alternatives to the 
rules of organizing and bargaining themselves.  And finally, neo-
corporatist bargaining is fully transparent and conducted in the open, 
there being no legal need to mask the arrangement.  Nonetheless, neo-
corporatism, concertation, and the form of labor lawmaking described 
here involve a similar kind of tripartite political exchange in which the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  222  JONAS PONTUSSON, SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND BRITISH LABOUR 42 (1988); 
see also JOHN B. WILLIAMSON & FRED C. PAMPEL, OLD-AGE SECURITY IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 81 (1993) (“[T]he ‘historic compromise’ has resulted in an exchange of industrial 
peace and wage restraint for a comprehensive set of welfare state programs . . . . The Swedish 
version of corporatism has involved minimal government involvement in bargaining between the 
employers’ organizations and the unions, but it has been the government that has enacted the so-
cial welfare program[s] which have constituted a key component of the historical compromise.”).  
Professor Peter Swenson argues that this conventional account is partly inaccurate, pointing to, 
inter alia, the ways in which Swedish employers supported many of the policies labor sought.  See 
PETER  A.  SWENSON, CAPITALISTS  AGAINST  MARKETS:  THE  MAKING  OF  LABOR  MAR-
KETS AND WELFARE STATES IN THE UNITED STATES AND SWEDEN 122, 269 (2002). 
  223  Lucio Baccaro & Marco Simoni, Policy Concertation in Europe: Understanding Govern-
ment Choice, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 1323, 1323 (2008); Baccaro, supra note 218, at 683.  The term 
is not original to Baccaro.  See, e.g., Oscar Molina & Martin Rhodes, Corporatism: The Past, 
Present, and Future of a Concept, 5 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 305, 313–19 (2002). 
  224  Baccaro, supra note 218, at 686. 
  225  See Lucio Baccaro & Marco Simoni, Centralized Wage Bargaining and the “Celtic Tiger” 
Phenomenon, 46 INDUS. REL. 426, 428–29 (2007); Baccaro, supra note 218, at 686–87. 
  226  See Baccaro, supra note 218, at 689.    
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private orderings of unions and employers and the public acts of the 
state come, in one manner or another, to constitute a single governance 
package. 
The domestic context offers several other partial analogues.  In ad-
vancing its goals indirectly, for example, tripartism resembles certain 
forms of conditional government actions that are the subject of the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.227  In one well-known case, consti-
tutional limitations made it uncertain whether the federal government 
could mandate directly that states set their drinking age at twenty-one.  
So in 1984, Congress achieved this same policy goal through indirect 
means: it withheld a portion of federal highway monies from any state 
that allowed sale of alcohol to persons under twenty-one years of 
age.228  Similarly, the Constitution prohibits the government from di-
rectly restricting abortions, but Congress has indirectly achieved some 
such restrictions by barring Medicaid funding for abortions229 and by 
providing for regulations barring family planning clinics that receive 
certain federal funds from recommending abortion.230  Thus, as in tri-
partite lawmaking, the conditional funding context involves a form of 
government indirection that can be deployed to circumvent relevant 
legal and constitutional strictures. 
Nonetheless, the analogy is far from perfect.  In the conditional 
funding context, the government acts indirectly, but it still acts trans-
parently because connection between the condition on the benefit and 
the benefit itself is explicit in the government’s action.  Thus, follow-
ing the above examples, Congress explicitly directed the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold a percentage of otherwise available high-
way funds from states “in which the purchase or public posses-
sion . . . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-
one years of age is lawful.”231  Similarly, the so-called Hyde Amend-
ment expressly prohibited “the use of any federal funds to reimburse 
the cost of abortions under the Medicaid program except under certain 
specified circumstances.”232  And section 1008 of the Public Health 
Service Act stated that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this 
subchapter shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of 
family planning.”233 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  227  See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989). 
  228  See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding the funding restriction). 
  229  See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 300–08 (1980). 
  230  See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 178–81 (1991). 
  231  Dole, 483 U.S. at 205 (alteration in original) (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
  232  Harris, 448 U.S. at 302 (citing Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979)). 
  233  Rust, 500 U.S. at 178 (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (2006)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
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Such transparency is, by design, absent in tripartite lawmaking.   
Unlike in the conditional funding context, the connection between 
government action and union organizing and bargaining rules is never 
explicit in the context of tripartism.234  Indeed, if the tripartite ar-
rangements described here followed the model used in the conditional 
funding setting, they would be invalidated on preemption grounds.235  
Rather than directly conditioning the receipt of some government ben-
efit on an employer’s agreement to new organizing and bargaining 
rules, then, tripartite arrangements exchange government action in one 
area of law for private agreements on organizing and bargaining.  The 
private agreements involved in these arrangements are thus crucial to 
tripartism because of tripartism’s demand for opacity — they are the 
transmission mechanism that allows for an opaque connection between 
government action in a nonlabor area of law and reordered labor or-
ganizing and bargaining rules.  Because the government action at issue 
in the unconstitutional conditions cases is transparent, private ordering 
of the sort involved in tripartite lawmaking is absent from, and indeed 
irrelevant to, the conditional funding context. 
This descriptive difference between tripartism and unconstitutional 
conditions points to an analytic one: the difficulty with preemption 
analysis under tripartism is distinct from the difficulty with constitu-
tional analysis under conditional benefit cases.  As the discussion in 
Part V elaborates, in the tripartism context, a primary difficulty for 
preemption analysis is detection.236  It is difficult to know when these 
deals have been made — in particular, it is difficult to uncover the 
connection between the government’s action and the private agree-
ment on organizing and bargaining rules — and thus it is difficult for 
courts to invalidate tripartite deals on preemption grounds.  Detection, 
however, is not a problem in the unconstitutional conditions context.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  234  In some instances, most notably the New Haven example, the relevant connections between 
the public and private acts have been publicized by political leaders involved in the arrangement.  
See section III.A.1, pp. 1174–80.  Even there, however, the official actions of the government — 
the permit grants, the zoning approvals, and the like — made no mention of the labor agreement. 
  235  For example, if New Haven made it an official requirement of its permitting process that 
developers agree to new rules for organizing, the requirement would be flatly preempted.  If Cali-
fornia changed its Medicaid rules to allow higher reimbursement for employers that agreed to 
card check, those rules would be preempted as well.  In fact, the Supreme Court has rejected the 
importation of unconstitutional conditions standards into labor preemption cases, noting that gov-
ernmental action that might survive this form of constitutional review can still fail preemption 
review.  See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2417 (2008).  Thus, in many re-
spects, labor preemption doctrine is more restrictive of government action than is the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine. 
  236  As Part V also discusses, detection is not the sole problem that tripartism presents for 
preemption analysis.  For example, without importing some form of motive inquiry into preemp-
tion doctrine, some examples of tripartite lawmaking would survive preemption scrutiny even if 
detected.  See section V.A.1, pp. 1213–16.    
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Again, because conditional benefit arrangements are transparent, the 
problem for constitutional analysis is not discovering when such ar-
rangements have been made, but developing a theory for assessing 
which conditions are permissible and which are not.237 
IV.  PREEMPTION REVISITED 
Understanding tripartite labor lawmaking is important, most basi-
cally, because it provides us with a more complete picture of the role of 
the local in contemporary labor law.  But the developments described 
here also illuminate some important characteristics of preemption it-
self.  This Part will discuss the difficulties for traditional preemption 
analysis that tripartism poses, the potential for local variation and   
experimentalism that tripartism creates (along with the limits of this 
potential), and the influence on state and local lawmaking that tripar-
tism exercises. 
A.  Tripartism and Preemption Analysis 
The possibility for tripartite lawmaking presents, first and fore-
most, some obvious difficulties for the successful operation of preemp-
tion doctrine.  In labor law as elsewhere, preemption analysis calls on 
courts to compare a federal law or policy with a challenged state or lo-
cal action.  The specific type of comparison courts engage in will vary 
with the type of preemption analysis.238  In “conflict preemption”   
cases, courts look to whether the state or local action conflicts with or 
stands as an obstacle to the congressional purposes expressed in the 
federal statute at issue.239  And in “field preemption,” courts determine 
whether the federal statute occupies its field and thereby precludes 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  237  For some discussion, see, for example, LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, 
REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 72–90 (1996); and CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 291–318 (1993). 
   At an even higher level of generality, the tripartite form of lawmaking described here re-
flects the now well-documented interdependence of public and private governance.  See generally 
GOVERNMENT  BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING  AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Free-
man & Martha Minow eds., 2009); Karl E. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358 (1982).  In the administrative law context, Professor Jody Freeman de-
tails private participation in ostensibly public administration: private actors “set standards, pro-
vide services, . . . deliver benefits[, and] . . . help implement, monitor, and enforce compliance with 
regulations.”  Freeman, supra note 92, at 547.  Professor Michael Vandenbergh offers another 
form of interdependence in administrative law, documenting how firms’ environmental conduct is 
often structured by contracts — like insurance, credit, or acquisition agreements — bargained in 
response to public regulation.  See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2030–35 (2005).  In the model of tripartite lawmaking described above, the 
public and private are indeed interdependent, albeit in a manner distinct from the ways these au-
thors describe. 
  238  See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 38, at 2100–07. 
  239  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 227–29 (2000).    
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state or local intervention in the same field.240  Labor law’s various 
preemption rules incorporate — at different moments — each of these 
various forms of review.241 
But in tripartite lawmaking, where the relevant state or local action 
takes place in a substantive area of law completely removed from the 
one governed by the federal statute, preemption analysis will struggle.  
Comparing the local action and the federal law will reveal no conflict.  
And the local act and the federal regime will occupy different fields.  It 
is only by identifying the entire tripartite political exchange — which 
requires not only that courts identify the parties’ private agreement, 
but also that they establish the connection between the government  
action and the private agreement — that preemption regimes can hope 
to capture these forms of lawmaking.  As discussed in more detail be-
low, however, this is an exceedingly difficult  — and often impossi-
ble — task.  And by hindering preemption analysis, tripartism under-
mines preemption’s central project of allocating exclusive regulatory 
authority to the federal government and ensuring a uniform system  
of law. 
This conclusion does not imply that tripartism renders doctrinal 
preemption analysis hopeless.  As Part V addresses, when a state or lo-
cal government publicly expresses support for the tripartite bargain — 
as occurred in the New Haven example  — it may be possible for 
courts to capture the tripartite arrangement through more muscular 
enforcement of existing rules.  Incorporating a robust motive inquiry 
into the doctrine might allow courts to smoke out the connections be-
tween local government enactments and private agreements and thus 
to invalidate an even broader range of tripartite lawmaking.242 
The challenge, however, is that increasing enforcement of existing 
rules or bringing a motive inquiry to preemption analysis would both 
likely produce a dynamic effect.  In short, the parties to tripartite 
lawmaking, including state and local government officials, could rela-
tively easily adjust to more aggressive preemption rules by making 
sure that their private agreements stay private and by masking the 
connections between the public and private components of their deals.  
For example, should labor preemption rules243 be read to capture in-
stances like the New Haven agreement, we might expect city officials 
in the future to seek similar outcomes without the attendant publicity.  
A mayor, that is, might make his demands clear to the relevant em-
ployer — and, of course, to the relevant union — without a press con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  240  See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 38, at 2105–07. 
  241  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 1569–79. 
  242  See section V.A.1, pp. 1213–16. 
  243  The rules elaborated in Golden State and Brown are of greatest potential relevance here.  
See supra pp. 1166–67.    
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ference at city hall.  Unions and employers also could change aspects 
of the way their agreements are constructed in order to make disclo-
sure less likely.  Thus, instead of proceeding under the SEIU Alliance 
Agreement model — which connects in a single document the agree-
ment on organizing rules and the nonlabor government action — the 
parties could execute two separate agreements, one concerning or-
ganizing rights and one concerning legislative cooperation, and then 
rely on other means of connecting the two.244 
B.  Tripartism and Experimentalism 
Although current preemption rules provide greater national uni-
formity than we would have without a doctrine of federal preemption, 
by hindering traditional preemption analysis, tripartite lawmaking 
enables some state and local departures from the federal regime and 
thus some measure of variation.  In the labor context, this dynamic 
provides states and cities with the opportunity to correct some of the 
NLRA’s most profound failings.  For example, while the NLRA fails 
to balance communicational opportunities for union and employer 
speech,245 the private agreements negotiated as part of tripartite labor 
lawmaking might correct this imbalance.246  As many have observed, 
the NLRA’s failure to adequately police employer interventions in   
union campaigns has interfered with the exercise of employee choice 
on the union question.247  By restricting these employer interven-
tions — either by requiring employer neutrality or by limiting the con-
texts in which employers can communicate opposition to unioniza-
tion — tripartite labor lawmaking can enhance the possibility for free 
employee choice.248  Similarly, while the NLRA’s bargaining obligation 
is undermined by the Board’s nearly meaningless remedial arsenal,249 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  244  Given a sufficient level of trust between the parties, an oral agreement might provide the 
relevant connection.  As noted below, by forcing the parties to hide their arrangements, a more 
robust preemption regime would make tripartite agreements more difficult to achieve and could 
thereby reduce their prevalence.  See section V.A.1, pp. 1213–16. 
  245  See, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 12, at 934; Estlund, supra note 12, at 307, 331 n.162. 
  246  For example, they might provide union organizers access to employer property and ensure 
that unions have accurate lists of eligible voters at the start of organizing efforts.  See, e.g., Cali-
fornia Alliance Agreement, supra note 149, at 46 (organizer access); id. at 45–46 (employee list); 
Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 11 (organizer access); id. at 10 (em-
ployee list). 
  247  See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 12, at 664–67, 680–91; Weiler, supra note 20, at 1770. 
  248  See, e.g., Election Principles Agreement, supra note 128, Exhibit A at 4 (ban on one-on-one 
meetings); California Alliance Agreement, supra note 149, at 43 (neutrality commitment); see also 
Cynthia Estlund, Freeing Employee Choice: The Case for Secrecy in Union Organizing and Vot-
ing,  123 H ARV.  L.  REV.  F.  10,  19 ( 2010), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/123_ 
estlund.pdf  (“Employer ‘neutrality’ in the organizing process  arguably  dissolves . . . the  asym-
metric stickiness of the nonunion default.”). 
  249  See, e.g., Weiler, supra note 27, at 360–61.    
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the kind of arbitration requirements for first contract bargaining con-
tained in some of tripartism’s private agreements is precisely the de-
vice that scholars recommend as a fix for “catastrophic underenforce-
ment of the statutory right of employees to bargain.”250 
In addition to these possibilities for substantive improvement, vari-
ation of the sort produced by tripartite lawmaking can provide some 
per se benefits.251  Primarily, by facilitating departures from the federal 
regime, tripartite lawmaking can contribute to a form of experimenta-
tion or “learning through variation.”252  For decades now, labor law 
has been beset by seemingly intractable debates over a series of fun-
damental questions: How should the rules of union organizing be 
structured so as to ensure genuine employee choice?  How far should 
the property rights of employers be abrogated in order to balance the 
organizational interests of workers and the business interests of firms?  
How should collective bargaining be structured and policed to ensure 
efficient and just outcomes?  The resolution of these questions de-
pends, in some measure, on normative and political premises that are 
unlikely to be affected by experimental evidence.  But these questions 
also turn in part on empirical issues: Does employer neutrality promote 
or hinder informed employee decisionmaking on the union question?  
What are the actual effects of interest arbitration provisions on con-
tract bargaining in the private sector?  The private agreements that 
emerge from tripartite lawmaking offer us some evidence that can help 
answer these questions and, as such, provide us some opportunities for 
learning about the best future course for labor law reform.253 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  250  Fisk & Pulver, supra note 13, at 47; see also id. at 48. 
  251  Variation also may impose some per se costs: most obviously, corporations operating across 
state and city lines have to accommodate different rules of union organizing and bargaining, 
whatever the substance of those rules may be.  See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemp-
tion: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.  REV.  1,  29 
(2007); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 
685, 693 n.36 (1991).  It is worth noting, as Professor Eileen Silverstein has, that corporations al-
ready face diverse state rules on a range of matters, including those in the closely related field of 
employment standards.  See Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption in Labor Law, 24 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 33–43 (1991). 
  252  See, e.g., Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 Y ALE L.J. 480, 485 (2008); 
see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288 (1998).  Estlund provides an example in the labor context: “In a federal 
system, state-by-state variations might ordinarily be expected, and might permit a kind of exper-
imentation around the edges of the national scheme.  Successful ‘experiments’ might have spread 
to other localities, and might even have provided credible models for national reform.”  Estlund, 
supra note 3, at 1569.  For examples from the general federalism literature, see Barry Friedman, 
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 397–400 (1997); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guaran-
tee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988); 
and Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–57 (2004). 
  253  Professors Adrienne Eaton and Jill Kriesky have conducted this type of research based on 
private recognition agreements.  See section II.C, pp. 1169–72.  See generally Adrienne E. Eaton 
& Jill Kriesky, NLRB Elections Versus Card Check Campaigns: Results of a Worker Survey, 62 
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The type of variation that tripartism permits is, however, limited  
in an important way.  This limitation stems from the fact that tripar-
tite labor lawmaking has a predictable political valence  — namely,   
a pro-union one.  The reason for this valence is that states and cities 
have wide-ranging regulatory leverage over employers.  To take just 
the examples developed here, many employers are dependent on cities 
and states for zoning and development permits, merger approvals, 
funding streams, and structuring the rules and costs of litigation.254  
Among many other examples, state and local health regulation, envi-
ronmental regulation, licensing requirements, tax policy, and transpor-
tation policy can all be critical to firms’ viability.  In contrast, states 
and cities have little regulatory leverage over unions.255  Indeed, any 
state or local law that burdened unions’ viability — that interfered,  
for example, with unions’ ability to organize workers or bargain collec-
tive agreements — would be invalid.256  And, as opposed to the rela-
tionships they have with employers, states and cities have far fewer 
points of interaction with unions that are independent of the NLRA’s 
subject matter. 
As a result of this regulatory asymmetry, the kind of tripartite 
lawmaking possible under preemption will almost always involve the 
exchange of state or local action favorable to employers for private 
agreements that shift the rules of union organizing and bargaining in  
a manner that facilitates unionization.  From a substantive perspec-
tive, this dynamic implies that tripartite lawmaking allows for the cor-
rection of only those NLRA pathologies that skew the law in a non-
union direction.  Other types of needed repairs — fixes that unions 
would not have an incentive to seek — will not be facilitated by tri-
partism.  From an experimentalist perspective, tripartism’s uniform 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 157 (2009); Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under 
Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001). 
  254  See Part III, pp. 1172–97. 
  255  To be sure, there is much that states and cities can do to further the interests of employees 
generally and thus to further the interests of union members — for example, minimum wage legis-
lation, safety regulation, and health care policies can all be of import.  But with respect to unions 
organizationally, states and localities have little to no regulatory authority.  One exception con-
cerns project labor agreements on public construction projects  — agreements through which 
states and cities ensure that union workers are hired to complete public jobs.  Thus, jurisdictions 
might condition their willingness to enter into project labor agreements — and similar types of 
arrangements — on unions’ private agreements with employers to move the rules of organizing in 
a nonunion direction.  The fact that the NLRA already skews the organizing process in a non-
union direction, however, see, e.g., Barenberg, supra note 12, at 959–62, suggests that the incen-
tives to construct this kind of tripartite arrangement will not be strong and hence that the exis-
tence of such tripartite deals is unlikely to be prevalent.  Even granting this possibility, however, 
the asymmetry in regulatory leverage — and thus in the political valence of tripartism — remains. 
  256  See Estlund, supra note 12, at 339 & n.204.  One exception is state property and trespass 
rules, which can be enforced in a manner that disables union organizers from accessing employer 
property.  For a discussion, see id. at 336–43.    
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political valence creates a similar limitation: tripartism may allow us 
to learn about reforms to the NLRA rules that unions desire, but   
it will not provide us with any data about changes that unions do not 
seek.257 
C.  Preemption’s Progeny: The Impact of Tripartism  
on State and Local Lawmaking 
Tripartism is designed to, and does in fact, allow local lawmaking 
to continue in the face of a robust federal preemption regime.  In doing 
so, tripartism facilitates departures from the federal rules of union or-
ganizing and bargaining that preemption intends to preclude.  But the 
existence of tripartite lawmaking requires that we take account not on-
ly of the fact of local variation under preemption, but also of the legal 
and political processes through which such variation is achieved.  This 
section addresses four concerns related to the form of tripartite law-
making that is possible under preemption: the opacity of tripartite ar-
rangements and the attendant implications for political accountability, 
the ability of tripartite lawmaking to avoid certain forms of legal and 
constitutional review, the production of what I will call a “politics of 
indirection” at the state and local level, and finally, the collateral ef-
fects on other areas of law.258 
1.  Opacity and Accountability. — The first concern stems from the 
opacity of tripartite lawmaking.  Because the government’s role in 
these arrangements is often difficult — if not impossible — to observe, 
tripartite lawmaking can create problems for political accountability. 
Again, preemption precludes state and local governments from 
enacting labor law directly, and thus there is never any recognizable 
labor legislation or regulation associated with tripartism.  Instead, lo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  257  This limitation on learning is compounded by the relative opacity of the private agreements 
through which the rules of organizing and bargaining are restructured.  See section IV.C.1, pp. 
1202–04.  These agreements are, after all, private, and the unions and employers that sign them 
are generally under no obligation to disclose their agreements to the public.  Cf. Vandenbergh, 
supra note 237, at 2069–73 (noting similar transparency problems in the context of “second-order” 
private agreements in the environmental context).  Preemption scrutiny, moreover, may provide 
parties with an incentive to keep these agreements private.  See infra pp. 1215–16.  As such, al-
though the agreements that are available publicly offer a source of data highly relevant to some 
central labor law debates, the private nature of the agreements makes this form of variation less 
than ideal from an experimentalist perspective. 
  258  A qualification is in order: the claim here is not that tripartite labor lawmaking would never 
occur in the absence of federal preemption.  As discussed below, given the right balance of politi-
cal power in a particular jurisdiction, unions might rely on tripartite political arrangements to 
achieve departures from the NLRA even absent preemption.  See section V.B, pp. 1217–20.  As 
such, the analysis here proceeds on the basis of more modest claims.  First, because states and 
cities would be free to enact labor reforms directly in the absence of federal preemption, tripartite 
lawmaking is more likely to occur under preemption than it would be absent preemption.   
Second, and irrespective of the first claim, because preemption permits tripartite lawmaking, we 
cannot fully assess the merits of the preemption regime without assessing this form of lawmaking.     
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cal governments enact laws that on their face have nothing to do with 
labor policy,259 or enter into development agreements that make no 
mention of unions or the rules of organizing,260 or issue public service 
commission decisions that are likewise silent as to their labor implica-
tions.261  As such, even a comprehensive examination of all state and 
local government actions would tell voters nothing about their repre-
sentatives’ contributions to the redesign of organizing and bargaining 
rules.  Instead, in order to identify instances of tripartite lawmaking, 
voters would need, first, public access to the private recognition 
agreements through which unions and employers reorder the rules   
of organizing, and second, some way of establishing the connection be-
tween the government action and the private agreements.  But neither 
type of data is generally available: unions and employers have no obli-
gation to disclose their private organizing agreements, and these con-
tracts generally become public only by happenstance.262  Establishing 
the connection between the government action and the private agree-
ments is also often difficult.  In some instances, like the SEIU Alliance 
Agreements, the contracts themselves make this connection.  But in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  259  See, e.g., Medi-Cal Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act, CAL.  WELF.  &  INST.  CODE 
§ 14126 (Deering 2006). 
  260  For example, although the New Haven Development Agreement contained the City’s ap-
proval of the project along with a series of “community benefit” provisions — including several 
jobs programs, a youth initiative, and a voluntary payment to the City — the document was silent 
with respect to the union-employer agreement on organizing rights.  See New Haven Develop-
ment Agreement, supra note 103, §§ 3.01–.02, at 5–12.  Similarly, the Hollywood and Highland 
Development Agreement lists a series of community benefits commitments by the developer — 
including provisions for living wage jobs and job training — but does not include the card check 
and neutrality commitment.  See Disposition and Development Agreement Between Trizechahn 
Hollywood, LLC and the City of Los Angeles, at ii (1998) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library) (table of contents). 
  261  The California and Nevada orders approving the merger of SBC and Pac-Tel reflect the 
telecommunication companies’ commitments regarding job levels and customer refunds, but are 
silent as to the CWA-SBC agreement on organizing rules.  See Pac. Telesis Grp., 71 C.P.U.C. 2d 
351 (1997); Settlement Stipulation at 3, Joint Application of Pac. Telesis Grp. & SBC Commc’ns, 
Inc., No. 96-5036 (Pub. Serv. Comm’n Nev. Sept. 25, 1996) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library). 
  262  The New Haven Election Principles Agreement, for example, is available only because it 
was attached as an exhibit to an affidavit filed in a district court preliminary injunction hearing 
approximately six months after the agreement was signed.  See Election Principles Agreement, 
supra note 128.  The CWA-SBC agreement is referenced only in an internal union publication.  
See COMMC’NS WORKERS OF AM., supra note 191, at 24 app.  The SEIU Alliance Agreements 
were made public by Consumer Watchdog, an organization that claims to “provid[e] an effective 
voice for taxpayers and consumers.”  About, CONSUMER  WATCHDOG, http://www.consumer 
watchdog.org/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2011); see also California Alliance Agreement, supra note 
149.  To be sure, references to some of these agreements — though not all — were made in press 
accounts.  See Matt Smith, Union Disunity, S.F.  WKLY., Apr. 11,  2007 (California Alliance 
Agreement); see also Martineau, supra note 136 (Election Principles Agreement); Press Release, 
Office of the Mayor, City of New Haven, supra note 115 (same).  None of those accounts, howev-
er, revealed the specifics of the organizing and bargaining rules agreed to by the parties.    
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others, the organizing agreements are as silent about their connection 
to governmental action as the governmental action is about its connec-
tion to private organizing agreements.  Press coverage  — like that 
available in the New Haven cancer center context  — can mitigate 
these opacity concerns, but coverage is often minimal to nonexistent.263 
2.  Avoiding Legal and Constitutional Review. — A second, and re-
lated, concern stems from the fact that tripartite lawmaking by neces-
sity involves an interdependent relationship between public govern-
mental actions and private union-employer agreements on organizing 
rights.  The problem is that the formal separation between the public 
and private components of tripartism can serve to immunize the over-
all arrangement from certain forms of legal review. 
Of course, one form of legal review that the structure of these ar-
rangements avoids is preemption itself, but the ability of these deals to 
minimize the chance for other types of scrutiny is also apparent.  For 
example, there is nothing constitutionally suspect about the New Ha-
ven Development Agreement itself, nor about the Yale–New Haven 
Election Procedures Agreement itself.  But, when the two agreements 
are understood as a single package  — which is, in fact, how they 
emerged — constitutional questions arise.  Namely, under the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, municipalities may not impose “exac-
tions” on proposed development projects unless the municipality first 
determines that “those exactions have a substantial nexus to impacts of 
the developments that would otherwise justify rejection of the devel-
opment proposal, and unless the exaction is roughly proportional in 
amount to those impacts.”264  Thus, had New Haven incorporated the 
Election Principles Agreement into the hospital’s Development Agree-
ment duties,265 the City’s actions would have been subject to an exac-
tions review, and the City would have been required to satisfy the 
Fifth Amendment’s nexus and proportionality requirements.  Finding 
that the Election Principles Agreement in fact constituted an exaction 
would require an expansive reading of existing case law.  But whether 
the Agreement in fact constituted an exaction is beside the point here: 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  263  Although the New Haven agreement was covered relatively extensively, the California Al-
liance agreement was reported primarily in SF Weekly and the Sacramento Business Journal.  See 
sources cited supra notes 162–76.  Similarly, while there was extensive reporting on the SBC-
PacTel merger, not a single press account mentioned the connection between the merger approval 
and the SBC-CWA card check and neutrality agreement.  For an example of press coverage of the 
merger, see Quickly Accepting Conciliatory California PUC Terms, supra note 196. 
  264  Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or Another 
Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 19 (2010) (discussing Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987)). 
  265  As noted above, see supra pp. 1177–78, the Development Agreement did not contain, and 
made no reference to, the Election Principles Agreement.  See New Haven Development Agree-
ment, supra note 103.    
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by formally separating the development and organizing agreements, 
the City was able to avoid the question. 
The existence of a private intermediary between the subject and 
object of governmental action — a private intermediary between, for 
example, a city and a developer — should not be sufficient reason to 
insulate these agreements from constitutional review.266  Indeed, this 
role of a private intermediary is familiar to numerous forms of public-
private governance: in many contexts, the private component in a pub-
lic-private arrangement shields the overall partnership from constitu-
tional and other types of legal review.267  Thus, when government del-
egates the operation of prisons, or military operations, or welfare 
programs to private parties, the democratic deficits that such delega-
tions can create raise substantial concerns.268  Scholars have rightly 
worried, for example, that these arrangements will result in “constitu-
tionally-exempt parties gaining authority over government programs 
and program participants,”269 and accordingly have demanded ways of 
restoring constitutional accountability.270 
3.  A Politics of Indirection. — In addition to requiring this inter-
dependent relationship between the public acts of local governments 
and the private agreements of unions and employers, tripartite labor 
lawmaking requires that local governments act in nonlabor areas of 
law.  This requirement raises a third concern: namely, just as local 
government action must be directed away from labor issues and into 
other areas of law, so too must local politics.  In other words, political 
action for labor rights must be rechanneled to support the nonlabor is-
sues that are of interest to employers.271 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  266  See Gillian E. Metzger, Private Delegations, Due Process, and the Duty to Supervise, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 237, at 291, 295.  Writing in a related context, Pro-
fessor Vicki Been has argued as much.  See Been, supra note 264, at 27–28. 
  267  See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 237. 
  268  See, e.g., id. at 5.   
  269  Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1374 (2003).  
  270  See, e.g., id. at 1456–86.  See generally Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Gov-
ern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 237, at 310. 
  271  The fact that tripartism requires unions and workers to support the political agendas of 
employers also could be viewed as productively aligning the interests of the parties.  That is, 
preemption prevents unions from enacting labor law reform directly, and thus tripartism requires 
that unions work collaboratively with employers to enact a package of reforms that advances the 
interests of both sides.  Collaboration in local politics, moreover, might lead to more collaborative 
and less confrontational labor-management relations in the workplace, a state of affairs many 
have long sought.  See generally Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: 
Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1993) (providing a histori-
cal, and critical, account of the place of labor-management cooperation in U.S. labor law); see also 
NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1982) (regarding 
as “enlightened” a view of the NLRA that permits certain forms of labor-management coopera-
tion).  However, two brief points bear mention.  First, this opportunity for collaboration, while 
presented by tripartism, is in no way unique to tripartism: unions and employers may exchange 
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Federalism scholars, of course, have consistently pointed to the 
benefits that flow from political participation by citizens at the state 
and local levels.272  On this view, preemption is a problem because it 
renders state and local decisionmaking, and with it state and local po-
litical participation, irrelevant.  Under preemption, the argument goes, 
the only politics that matter are federal politics, those directed at far-
off Washington and distant from the everyday lives of the citizenry.273  
As Professor Neil Siegel puts it, “If direct federal regulation removes 
states from the regulatory scene, there is no meaningful sense in which 
they can . . . advance political participation . . . .”274 
The model of tripartite lawmaking developed here suggests that, 
with respect to labor preemption, federalism scholars have this one   
only partly right.  Labor preemption, that is, does not in fact make 
state and local politics irrelevant to the development of labor law.   
Even under the NLRA’s extraordinarily broad labor preemption re-
gime, state and local decisionmaking — and thus state and local politi-
cal participation — remains essential.  As noted above, many thou-
sands of union members and their allies participated extensively in the 
campaigns surrounding the New Haven Cancer Center and Medicaid 
rate reform in California.275  But, while labor preemption does not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
political support for each other’s legislative agenda even where preemption does not foreclose ei-
ther side from pursuing that agenda unilaterally.  Second, while exchanges of this type may serve 
to align and advance the interests of unions and employers in beneficial ways, the deals may also 
come at the expense of third parties who are excluded from the bargain.  Cf. Michael D. Gilbert, 
Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 834–36 (2006); Thomas 
Stratmann,  Logrolling,  in P ERSPECTIVES  ON  PUBLIC  CHOICE:  A  HANDBOOK  322,  328–32 
(Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (noting the costs that third parties or minorities may bear when a 
legislature engages in logrolling). 
  272  Professor David Shapiro thus writes that “one of the stronger arguments for a decentralized 
political structure is that, to the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus 
more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to 
the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized.”  SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 91–92.  
Professor Barry Friedman argues that “state and local governments appear to serve as breeding 
grounds for democracy.”  Friedman, supra note 14, at 391; see also Hoke, supra note 251, at 712 
(“A  vigorous republican federalism would repose substantial political authority in subnational 
governments because of their greater access to ordinary citizens and their participatory efforts.”). 
  273  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 14, at 389–90 (“When we despair of the operations of our 
national government, we tend to . . . bemoan the apathy and lack of participation of average citi-
zens. . . . [S]tate and local government does provide many more avenues for citizen participation 
than does the national government.” (footnote omitted)).  Although their own view of preemp-
tion’s effects is more nuanced, as described below, Fisk and Oswalt capture this position nicely by 
writing: “Preemption, in effect, functions as a form of repression.  It tells citizens that it is point-
less to organize politically at the local level and engage in democratic action to create a better so-
ciety because all power is held by a seemingly remote federal authority.”  Fisk & Oswalt, supra 
note 10, at 1535. 
  274  Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. 
REV. 1629, 1651 (2006). 
  275  Participation ranged from citizen involvement in lobbying, to letter writing and public pro-
test.  See sources cited supra notes 98 (New Haven Cancer Center), 163–64 (Long-Term Care 
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render local politics irrelevant, it does give rise to a politics of indirec-
tion.276  While workers and their allies participated actively in the 
campaigns described above, their participation was channeled away 
from reforming the union organizing process and toward supporting 
government policies desired by employers.  Thus, instead of demand-
ing that New Haven enact reforms that would make unionization easi-
er, unions, workers, and their allies mobilized around zoning and per-
mitting decisions.  The Communications Workers pressed California 
and Nevada not to improve their labor laws, but to allow SBC to 
merge with PacTel.  And in California, the union and its members 
pressed for Medicaid changes and tort reform.277 
Professor Catherine Fisk and Michael Oswalt describe a similar 
dynamic in their work on Wal-Mart activism.  They explain how   
activists who hoped to compel Wal-Mart to improve its health care 
and labor policies were stymied both by ERISA and by federal labor 
preemption.278  Unable to use state law to require Wal-Mart to offer 
health insurance or to make it easier for workers to unionize, advo-
cates have instead turned to zoning and land use processes in an   
attempt simply to keep Wal-Mart away from certain jurisdictions.279  
Accordingly, Fisk and Oswalt recognize that preemption does not 
render state and local politics irrelevant but that it nonetheless results 
in a channeling of political energies and participation that involves 
“sublimating basic issues of dignity and justice for zoning.”280  As they 
put it, “[s]ite fights do offer the opportunity for civic engagement . . . .  
Yet, the usual topics of land-use planning — square footage, sign size 
and placement, traffic flow  — are far removed from the issues   
that spark most anti-Wal-Mart activism: wages and health benefits.”281  
Moreover, this channeling of political energies can be problematic   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Reimbursement Act).  The California legislation also produced significant opposition and led to  
a countermobilization by nursing home advocacy groups.  See, e.g., Letter from Virginia Knowl-
ton, Dir. of Pub. Policy, Prot. & Advocacy, Inc., to Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Aug. 
31,  2004),  available at http://www.disabilityrightsca.org/news/AB_1629_(Frommer)_Governor_ 
letter.pdf. 
  276  See Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 10, at 1523–28 (describing the “startling redirection” of politi-
cal participation, id. at 1523). 
  277  In all cases, of course, by pressing for policies that their employers desire, workers may indi-
rectly contribute to their own interests by enabling their employers to sustain employment levels, 
pay higher wages, and the like.  In the Medicaid rate reform campaigns, this dynamic is most 
clear: increased Medicaid reimbursement rates — and particularly a cost-based system that expli-
citly accounts for higher labor costs — can enable employers to, inter alia, pay higher wages and 
offer improved staffing ratios.  See HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 142, at ii–v. 
  278  Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 10, at 1510–11. 
  279  See id. at 1521–23.  As noted above, Fisk and Oswalt contend that “labor preemption 
makes it impossible for workers to enact state laws that make it feasible to organize themselves 
collectively and demand better wages.”  Id. at 1511.  The claim in this Article is to the contrary. 
  280  Id. at 1523. 
  281  Id. at 1528.    
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in the long term for both civic participation and social movement   
dynamism.282 
To be sure, unions quite often engage in advocacy on a range of is-
sues far broader than the rules of organizing and collective bargain-
ing.283  In recent years, for example, unions and their members have 
pressed for reform of the health care system,284 fought for changes to 
immigration policy,285 advocated for stronger environmental laws,286 
and opposed the war in Iraq.287  These types of engagements reflect 
the basic fact that union members’ concerns and interests extend 
beyond the workplace.288  But the political redirection entailed by tri-
partite lawmaking is different because the targets of political activism 
in tripartism are selected according to the political goals of employers.  
As such, workers need have no direct interest in — and may well have 
an aversion to — the policies they are engaged in supporting.289  As 
Fisk and Oswalt argue, moreover, it is the detaching of political aims 
from “on-the-ground” concerns that puts the prospects for civic partic-
ipation and social movement viability at risk.290 
4.   Collateral  Effects. — Finally, tripartism’s requirement that local 
governments rely on other areas of law to effect private reorderings of 
organizing rules has repercussions for those other areas of law.  What 
these repercussions are depends, however, on the political balance of 
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  282  Id. at 1530 (“[T]he site fight serves as a one-size-fits-all funneling mechanism 
that . . . leav[es] the foundation for democratic action less sturdy and less likely to spark sustained 
activist responses.”). 
  283  For a general account, see Lowell Turner & Richard W. Hurd, Building Social Movement 
Unionism: The Transformation of the American Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVE-
MENT:  LABOR’S  QUEST  FOR  RELEVANCE  IN  THE  TWENTY-FIRST  CENTURY  9 (Lowell 
Turner, Harry C. Katz & Richard W. Hurd eds., 2001). 
  284  See, e.g., Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Late-Innings Hardball in Health Care Push, ASSO-
CIATED PRESS, Mar. 17, 2010, available at http://www.timesrepublican.com/page/content.detail/ 
id/523905.html. 
  285  See, e.g., Laura Litvan, Focus Is on Legal Foreign Workers; Senate Democrats’ New Ap-
proach Would Give Power to Commission, WASH. POST, May 24, 2010, at A17. 
  286  See e.g.,  About the BlueGreen Alliance, BLUEGREEN  ALLIANCE,  http://www.bluegreen 
alliance.org/about_us?id=0001 (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
  287  See, e.g., Mark Naymik, Hundreds Rally Against the Iraq War; Demonstrators Lend Sup-
port to Labor Push, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 3, 2006, at B5. 
  288  It is also true that unions have enjoyed some of their greatest periods of growth and vibran-
cy when they have advocated for the interests of working people in general, and not only for  
union members.  See Turner & Hurd, supra note 283, at 12–15 (noting that labor enjoyed great 
success in the 1930s as a “transforming social movement,” id. at 12, but encountered problems in 
the 1970s with labor leaders presiding over “increasingly narrow member-oriented organizations,” 
id. at 14–15). 
  289  As illustrated by the Medicaid rate campaigns, there are instances in which the employers’ 
political demands are more directly relevant to, and beneficial for, the workers involved in the 
tripartite exchange.  See supra note 277; see also HARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 142, at v (re-
viewing the wage effects of California’s Long-Term Care Reimbursement Act).  In such cases, the 
concern about political indirection will be less acute. 
  290  See Fisk & Oswalt, supra note 10, at 1531.    
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power in each jurisdiction.  The clearest effect occurs in contexts 
where, absent the preemption regime, labor could secure the enact-
ment of its desired labor law reforms without support from employers 
or other interest groups.  To take one example, in a world without fed-
eral preemption, a state might respond to union demands by enacting 
a law requiring card check recognition.  With preemption, however, 
the jurisdiction cannot pass this legislation directly.  The union move-
ment may therefore demand action on another piece of legislation in 
order to secure employers’ private agreement on card check.  Thus, in-
stead of passing the card check law, the state might change its Medi-
caid reimbursement rules.291  Under these political assumptions, then, 
labor preemption not only prevents the passage of local labor legisla-
tion, but also results in the reshaping of another area of law.  In other 
words, by redirecting labor’s political power, preemption impacts areas 
of law with which it should have no concern.292 
It is quite possible, however, that even absent preemption, labor 
could enact its desired reforms only with the cooperation of employers 
or other interest groups.  To continue with the same example, in order 
to secure a state card check law, the union movement might need to 
offer its support for an employer-sponsored bill, say, Medicaid reform.  
In this setting, then, labor and nonlabor issues become part of a single 
legislative package — forming the two parts of a legislative logroll — 
even absent preemption.293  Nonetheless, the manner in which nonla-
bor areas of law are impacted differs in a significant way as a result of 
the preemption rules.  In a traditional legislative logroll, constituents 
may not know of the trade that underlies their representatives’ votes 
on two pieces of legislation,294 but the constituents can know how their 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  291  See section III.A.2, pp. 1180–87. 
  292  A second way of understanding this dynamic is that labor preemption results in a transfer 
of political power from unions to employers.  Absent preemption, that is, unions could deploy 
their political resources directly and on behalf of their own members — for example, they could 
press the state legislature for a card check law.  Preemption, however, means that unions cannot 
use their local political resources in this way: it would be fruitless to ask the state legislature to 
enact card check legislation because such legislation would be quickly invalidated.  Instead, with 
preemption, in order to secure card check, labor must deploy its political resources toward a goal 
chosen by employers — such as securing Medicaid reform, tort reform, or development permits. 
  293  For general discussions of logrolling, along with assessments of its normative implications, 
see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1338–48 (2000); and 
Stratmann, supra note 271.  The prevailing view is that logrolling will benefit the parties to the 
logroll, but may be socially harmful if the costs imposed on nonparties exceed the benefits to the 
parties.  See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 271, at 836.  
  294  See Gilbert, supra note 271, at 846 (“[R]educing the number of provisions in a bill . . . clouds 
the tradeoffs [citizens’] representatives are required to make . . . .”).  Traditional logrolling also 
may raise transparency concerns if it is difficult for legislators to perceive the political deals that 
undergird legislation.  As Professor Michael Gilbert explains, when a logroll involves separate 
bills, “legislators who are not privy to the logroll” may fail to “understand[] what political deals 
are unfolding around [them].”  Id.  Thus, a legislator who supports Medicaid rate reform, but 
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representatives voted on each individual piece of legislation.  In the 
labor context, for example, if Medicaid reform and card check are log-
rolled, constituents may not know that the bills form a single legisla-
tive deal, but they will know that their representatives supported both 
pieces of legislation.  With labor lawmaking under preemption, how-
ever, only one part of the legislative deal takes place inside the legisla-
ture, and thus only one piece of the deal is transparent to constituents: 
legislators vote on Medicaid reform, but there is no public vote on the 
private card check agreement.  For constituents who support Medicaid 
reform, but would not support a Medicaid–card check trade, this may 
be a significant concern.295 
V.  POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM 
As the last Part revealed, the form of tripartite lawmaking that 
continues under preemption allows for variation from the federal   
regime, but it achieves that variation in a manner that raises a set  
of concerns.  For some, including the parties to these arrangements, 
considerations of this sort may be less relevant than the substantive 
policy outcomes that tripartism allows.  From this perspective, the   
local reordering of organizing rules and the securing of local govern-
ment action — like the enactment of Medicaid rate reform — will fig-
ure more prominently than the debate between variation and unifor-
mity, and will have greater relevance than accountability, indirection, 
and opacity. 
From a broader perspective, however, the implications of tripartism 
are different.  Namely, the possibility for tripartite lawmaking suggests 
that the current preemption regime is ideal for neither proponents nor 
opponents of preemption.  For preemption’s proponents — for those 
who believe national uniformity remains the right approach for labor 
law — the variation that tripartite lawmaking allows will be a cause 
for concern.  For preemption’s opponents — for those who believe that 
some form of decentralization is now the appropriate course for labor 
law  — the variation that tripartite lawmaking allows will appear a 
step in the right direction.  But both the scope and form of variation 
that is possible under preemption will concern those who favor a de-
centralized and experimentalist system of labor law.  Irrespective of 
one’s position on preemption, moreover, the accountability problems 
tripartism presents, its law-eluding qualities, the politics of indirection 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
would not support a joint Medicaid–card check bill, may nonetheless, and contrary to her actual 
preferences, vote for the Medicaid bill. 
  295  This type of transparency problem is not unique, and may be no more significant than that 
which inheres in several common legislative practices that may be as difficult for constituents to 
observe (for example, the practice of killing bills in committee).    
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it requires, and its collateral effects on other areas of law provide sig-
nificant reasons to consider reform. 
As such, the existence of tripartite lawmaking gives cause for both 
labor law nationalists and those who favor decentralization to seek 
amendment of the existing preemption regime.  But the desired type of 
reform will be starkly different for those who favor national uniformi-
ty and for those who support local variation.  Preemption’s proponents 
will desire reforms that prohibit tripartism in a manner that enhances 
uniformity, while preemption’s opponents will want legal reforms that 
preclude tripartism in a manner that increases variation in labor law. 
Determining which type of reform is optimal thus requires a prior 
resolution of whether labor law should, in fact, be centralized or de-
centralized.  Rather than attempting to resolve that question, this Part 
instead offers a set of potential approaches, two of which will appeal 
to preemption’s proponents and another that will appeal to those who 
favor decentralization.  Accordingly, this Part begins by suggesting two 
ways in which tripartite lawmaking might be prevented in order to  
increase uniformity.  First, the scope of NLRA preemption doctrine 
could be expanded even further — or existing doctrine could be en-
forced more expansively — in order to capture and invalidate the form 
of local labor lawmaking described here.  Second, the type of private 
organizing agreements that are a central element of this form of labor 
lawmaking could be banned.  This Part then notes how tripartite 
lawmaking might be prevented in order to increase variation and   
allow for more genuine experimentation: by relaxing, or potentially 
eliminating, NLRA preemption rules, we could enable direct local in-
terventions into labor law, thereby removing the conditions that call 
for tripartism. 
With regard to the first approach, this Part will argue that while 
expanding the reach of preemption doctrine enjoys some conceptual 
support, this approach faces significant practical impediments.  Pro-
hibiting private ordering of organizing rules, moreover, constitutes an 
overbroad and ultimately unjustifiable response to the costs of tripar-
tite lawmaking.  In contrast, relaxing the preemption regime seems 
more likely to succeed, and would allow for the benefits of variation 
without the costs associated with tripartism. 
Of course, depending on how significant the costs of tripartism are 
perceived to be, proponents and opponents of preemption might prefer 
the status quo to reforms designed by the other side.  For example, la-
bor law nationalists might rather live with the costs of tripartite law-
making — and the scope of variation it allows — than see a regime 
defined by relaxed preemption rules.  Some localists, by the same to-
ken, might prefer the scope and form of variation possible under tri-   
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partism — even with its costs — to a more robust preemption doc-
trine.296  In this respect, the status quo constitutes a second-best re-
gime that members of both sides might accept if their own preferred 
reforms are not attainable.  What this Part offers, then, is a discussion 
of possibilities for moving from a second-best status quo to a regime 
closer to the ideal — first as defined by those who support labor law 
preemption and then by those who oppose it. 
Before turning to this discussion, a word is in order about the polit-
ical prospects for amending the NLRA’s preemption rules.  Given the 
repeated failure of substantive labor law reform efforts over the past 
several decades,297 skepticism about the practical likelihood of chang-
ing the NLRA’s preemption regime is warranted.  There may be rea-
sons, however, why preemption reform stands a better chance of 
enactment than does substantive labor law reform.  First, preemption 
reform offers something to both sides of the political debate: loosening 
the NLRA’s preemption standards would enable states and localities 
where business interests predominate to move the law in business-
friendly directions, while states and localities where labor interests 
have sufficient sway could move the law in union-friendly direc-
tions.298  This dynamic distinguishes preemption reform from previous 
attempts at substantive NLRA reforms, which have all been under-
stood as favoring either labor or management, and which have all 
foundered as a result.299  Second, the costs of tripartite lawmaking ex-
tend beyond labor and management, impacting wide cross-sections of 
society.  Indeed, the political accountability concerns that come with 
tripartism impact all constituents, and when tripartite arrangements 
have collateral effects on other areas of law, the individuals and inter-
est groups concerned with these nonlabor areas will have pointed rea-
sons to care about tripartism.  Although the outcome is impossible to 
predict, with a wider array of interests invested in preemption reform 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  296  Of course, it is also possible that some nationalists would rather live with variation than 
with the costs that tripartite lawmaking imposes, just as some localists might prefer stricter uni-
formity to the costs of tripartism. 
  297  See Part II, pp. 1162–72. 
  298  For a discussion of how states might vary labor policy absent a preemptive NLRA, see  
Richard B. Freeman & Joel Rogers, The Promise of Progressive Federalism,  in R EMAKING 
AMERICA: DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC POLICY IN AN AGE OF INEQUALITY 205, 211–19 (Joe 
Soss, Jacob S. Hacker & Suzanne Mettler eds., 2007). 
  299  The extent of this political dynamic would depend on the manner in which Congress 
amended the preemption regime.  As discussed below, see  section V.B, pp. 1217–20, Congress 
could simply eliminate or loosen the preemptive effect of the NLRA’s organizing and bargaining 
provisions.  But Congress might also amend the statute in a manner that establishes the federal 
rules as a “floor” below which states and cities could not go.  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 
1578–79.  This type of preemption reform would more clearly favor unions and therefore would 
be less likely to garner political support among employers.    
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than in substantive labor law reform, the prospects for enactment may 
be different. 
Irrespective of the political prospects for reform, however, the dis-
cussion in this Part illuminates some important aspects of the interac-
tion between tripartism and preemption law.  In particular, as this Part 
argues, it is difficult to conceive of any set of preemption rules that 
could effectively capture and invalidate the tripartite arrangements   
described above.  On the other hand, a relaxation of the NLRA’s 
preemption rules seems more likely to reduce the prevalence of tripar-
tite lawmaking. 
A.  Preventing Tripartism and Bolstering Uniformity 
1.  An (Even) Broader Preemption Regime. — One approach to 
prohibiting tripartite lawmaking in order to enhance uniformity would 
involve courts’ identifying and holding preempted the state and local 
government actions involved in these arrangements.  In certain in-
stances, a robust application of existing doctrine might suffice.  In 
Golden State, for example, the Court held preempted Los Angeles’s 
decision to condition the award of a taxi franchise on the taxi compa-
ny’s agreement to settle a strike.300  Similarly, in Brown, the Court 
held that California could not “predicat[e] benefits on [employers’]   
refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law,” and thus the 
state’s statute prohibiting the use of public funds for union-related   
activity was preempted.301  A broad reading of Golden State and 
Brown might therefore reach an instance like New Haven’s decision  
to tie a development permit to the hospital’s agreement on organizing 
rights.302 
Even this broad reading of existing doctrine, however, would not 
capture other iterations of tripartite lawmaking, and reaching all forms 
of tripartism would require a significant expansion of the existing la-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  300  See supra pp. 1166–67. 
  301  Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2416–17 (2008) (quoting Livadas v. Brad-
shaw, 512 U.S. 107, 116 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This rule applies where the 
state is not acting within its proprietary capacity.  See id. at 2415. 
  302  The reading would have to be broad because in both Golden State and Brown it was clear 
that the employers would have received the public benefit in question had the government not 
interposed the labor-related conditions.  For example, in Golden State, the taxi company had been 
found “in compliance with all terms and conditions of their franchise[]” and was nonetheless   
denied the franchise because of its refusal to settle the Teamsters strike.  Golden State Transit 
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 610 (1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416.  In the New Haven context, and others like it, it is 
far less clear that the employer would have received the public benefit in the absence of labor-
related issues, particularly given the “ad hoc” nature of local land use and development processes 
and the range of factors that municipalities consider in making decisions in this setting.  See, e.g., 
Schragger, supra note 105, at 511 (citing ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE 
CONTROLS 304, 308–09 (3d ed. 2005)).    
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bor preemption regime.303  Such an expansion might be possible, and 
could perhaps be achieved by incorporating a robust motive analysis 
into preemption review.  Following Kagan’s suggestion, for example, 
courts could invalidate the nonlabor enactments that are part of tripar-
tite lawmaking if they found that the government would not have 
acted in the way it did but for the concomitant private design of orga-
nizing rules.  A motive analysis of this type could be justified on con-
sequentialist grounds: by identifying, for example, legislation passed 
with improper motives (that is, passed because of the legislation’s ef-
fect of reordering organizing rules), it might be possible to smoke out 
legislation that has impermissible effects.304  Similarly, this kind of mo-
tive inquiry could also be justified on the ground that it would likely 
impose “enactment costs” on state and local governments, costs that 
would decrease the prevalence of tripartite lawmaking.305  Indeed, a 
judicial inquiry into legislative motive would make it more costly for 
legislators to publicize the reasons they supported a given measure — 
doing so would increase the likelihood that the relevant decision would 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  303  Under existing law, for example, it is clear that California could not have amended its Medi-
Cal reimbursement regime such that employers who agreed to card check and neutrality would 
receive higher reimbursement rates than employers who did not adopt such labor-related policies.  
See supra pp. 1181–82.  Similarly, the state could not have amended the elder abuse law to pro-
vide more favorable rules of evidence for nursing homes that agreed to arbitrate first contract dis-
putes.  See supra note 147.  Laws of this type clearly would “predicat[e] benefits on [employers] 
refraining from conduct protected by federal labor law.”  Brown, 128 S. Ct. at 2416–17 (quoting 
Livadas, 512 U.S. at 116) (internal quotation marks omitted).  But this is not what the California 
Alliance Agreement did, or contemplated.  Instead, under that agreement, California enacted   
Medicaid rate reforms that applied to all nursing homes in the state irrespective of the nursing 
homes’ labor-related policies.  Under current law, such actions are not preempted by the NLRA.  
See, e.g., N.Y . T el. Co. v . N.Y . State Dep’t of Labor , 440 U.S. 519, 531–33 (1979) (holding that 
laws of general applicability are not preempted even when they “alter[] the economic balance be-
tween labor and management,” id. at 532). 
  304  See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 213, at 507–08.  Accordingly, even if preemption analysis is con-
cerned solely with a state action’s “effect on federal rights,” motive analysis might be an approach 
to determine these effects.  Livadas, 512 U.S. at 119 (emphasis added).  There is an active debate 
in the circuit courts regarding whether a motive inquiry is appropriate in labor preemption cases.  
Thus, in Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 57 v. Sage Hospitality Re-
sources, LLC, the Third Circuit held that “a factual investigation into the particular subjective 
motives of the relevant government agency” was inappropriate in preemption analysis and stated 
that “[w]e see the test as objective, based on the language and probable effect of the state ordin-
ance or specification.”  390 F.3d 206, 216 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004).  In contrast, in Metropolitan Milwau-
kee Ass’n of Commerce v. Milwaukee County, the Seventh Circuit endorsed a pretext inquiry, 
holding that the “spending power may not be used as a pretext for regulating labor relations.”  431 
F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2005).  Of course, the approach to motive analysis outlined here may sug-
gest that this judicial debate has missed the way in which motive analysis can assist in determin-
ing legislative effects.  See Kagan, supra note 213, at 506–08. 
  305  See Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and the 
Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2, 50 (2008).    
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be invalidated on preemption grounds — and thereby reduce the polit-
ical benefits of engaging in this form of tripartism.306 
Although enforcing existing rules — like those in Golden State and 
Brown — with more rigor and expanding the preemption regime to in-
clude a motive analysis make conceptual sense as means to prohibit 
tripartite lawmaking, both approaches suffer from the same pragmatic 
limitations.  A threshold issue concerns detection.  The problem is that 
there often will be no one with the right information and incentives to 
bring preemption challenges in this context.  In many cases, the orga-
nizing agreements, and the connection between those agreements and 
the relevant state action, will be known only to the three parties.  But 
neither the government decisionmakers who enact the relevant laws 
nor the unions who seek the organizing agreements will have an incen-
tive to mount preemption challenges.  In many cases, the employer 
will lack that incentive as well.307 
Exacerbating these detection problems is a second and more   
fundamental issue, one identified above.308  Again, should tripartite 
lawmaking be subjected to enhanced preemption scrutiny, the parties 
likely would take measures to drive their arrangements even farther 
underground.  And, unlike straightforward state and local labor 
enactments  — which are impossible to hide  — keeping private the 
components (and the relevant connections between the various compo-
nents) of tripartite labor lawmaking is not difficult to do. 
Thus, parties to New Haven–type arrangements could easily adjust 
to a more aggressive application of Golden State and Brown: govern-
ment officials could avoid publicizing the deal beyond the parties — 
communicating with the relevant unions and employers, but not with 
the general public — while unions and employers could structure their 
agreements to mask the connection between organizing rules and gov-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  306  See id. at 52.  The point should not be overstated.  As Professor Matthew Stephenson notes, 
politicians may have ways to convey their actual motives to interested parties without announcing 
these motives to the general public.  Id. at 54.  Thus, in our context, decisionmakers often will not 
need to make any public statements in order to ensure that the relevant unions and employers are 
aware of how and why the decisionmakers are acting. 
  307  Such incentive will not always be lacking.  Where the employer views the agreement on or-
ganizing rules as the means to gain the union’s affirmative assistance in securing some desired 
government action, the employer will have no motive to claim that the state action, which it de-
sires, is preempted.  Where, however, the employer views the organizing agreement as necessary 
to prevent the union from blocking delivery of a desired government benefit that the employer 
believes it would otherwise receive, the employer might have both the necessary information and 
the right incentives to mount a preemption challenge.  Even here, however, it is far from certain 
that the employer would proceed with a preemption challenge.  Given significant difficulties re-
lated to proof and remedies, employers might well decide that they can better advance their inter-
ests by accepting an organizing agreement and obtaining the relevant municipal action than by 
bringing a preemption claim under the NLRA. 
  308  See supra pp. 1198–99.    
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ernment enactment.309  With respect to incorporating a motive analysis 
into preemption doctrine, the literature on legislative motive recognizes 
that judicial inquiry into motive might well be futile because of legisla-
tors’ ability to “hide bad legislative intent”310: if courts invalidate stat-
utes based on illegitimate motive, legislators will respond by not re-
vealing their motives or by offering alternative motives for the same 
pieces of legislation.311  More to the point, as Professor Matthew Ste-
phenson argues, the judicial inquiry into legislative motive can   
encourage politicians to “make sure their true motives and interests are 
communicated to relevant constituency groups” but not to the public 
at large.312  In our context, motive analysis could be subverted if   
the relevant connections between public acts and private ordering   
are made known to the unions and employers involved but not other-
wise disclosed.313 
2.  Prohibiting Private Ordering. — Because tripartite lawmaking 
depends on the ability of unions and employers to redesign privately 
the rules of organizing and bargaining, prohibiting this form of private 
ordering would also prevent tripartite lawmaking and enhance uni-
formity.  Such a prohibition could be accomplished in any of several 
ways.  For example, Congress could prohibit private reordering direct-
ly, or by rewriting section 301 so as to deny courts jurisdiction to en-
force these agreements.  The courts could invalidate such agreements 
by reading section 301 more narrowly than they have to date,314 and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  309  See supra p. 1204. 
  310  Hasen, supra note 212, at 861; see John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation 
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1214–15 (1970); Kagan, supra note 213, at 438 n.77. 
  311  See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 213, at 438–39 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968)). 
  312  Stephenson, supra note 305, at 54.  This is not to say that an attempt to invalidate these 
forms of tripartite labor lawmaking would be entirely futile.  Requiring the parties to mask their 
arrangements even further than they do now would impose added costs and make the agreements 
more difficult to achieve.  If, for example, employers could not commit in writing to exchange ex-
panded organizing rights for union political support, the incidence of such agreements might   
decline.  And, per Stephenson’s argument on enactment costs, the increased need for secrecy 
might lessen the incentives that state and local politicians have to enter into these bargains.  See 
id. at 53–54. 
  313  Aside from the significant practical problems with attempting to enforce preemption rules 
against tripartite lawmaking, doing so would also present a remedial issue.  If a court, in hearing 
a preemption challenge to a tripartite arrangement, invalidated the government enactment, the 
union would have the benefit of the private organizing agreement, while the employer would lose 
the benefit of the government action for which it bargained.  One possible response is for a court 
to hold an organizing agreement unenforceable, under section 301, if the agreement is secured 
through a tripartite deal that results in preempted governmental action.  See supra p. 1170 (dis-
cussing section 301).  Another possibility is that parties would adjust to this potential outcome by 
refining their organizing agreements ex ante, writing them so as to remain in effect only so long as 
the predicate government action remains in effect. 
  314  See, e.g., Serv. Emps. Int’l Union v. St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 344 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2003).    
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the NLRB could preclude such agreements by refusing to recognize 
unions organized pursuant to private rules.315 
Although any of these approaches undoubtedly would be effective, 
precluding unions and employers from designing alternatives to the 
NLRA rules is not justified by the costs inherent in tripartite lawmak-
ing.  While some union-employer agreements on organizing and bar-
gaining rules are achieved in the manner described here, many — pre-
sumably the great majority — are not.316  As noted above, many such 
agreements are secured through the traditional collective bargaining 
process.317  In other instances, employers agree to private organizing 
agreements in order to avoid costs that unions could otherwise im-
pose — costs ranging from strikes and picketing, to boycotts, to pres-
sure from union-controlled pension funds.318  Some employers report 
that they accepted the terms of private organizing agreements because 
unionization was useful in securing business.319  Other employers re-
port that the organizing agreements, and the unionization they facili-
tated, allowed them to attract more qualified workers.320  Whatever 
the costs of tripartite lawmaking, then, they cannot justify the preclu-
sion of union-employer agreements made in contexts that have nothing 
to do with tripartism. 
B.  Preventing Tripartism and Enhancing Local Variation 
Instead of prohibiting tripartite lawmaking in an attempt at bol-
stering uniformity, we might also attempt to eliminate tripartism in a 
manner that increases variation in labor law.  We could do so by relax-
ing the NLRA’s preemption regime and enabling state and local gov-
ernments to enact alternative rules of union organizing and bargain-
ing.321  To this end, Congress could simply eliminate the preemptive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  315  See Dana Corp., 351 N.L.R.B. 434, 441–43 (2007) (establishing limitations on the binding 
effect of voluntary recognition). 
  316  Because we do not have anything approaching a full account either of the total number of 
these agreements or of how many are achieved through each of the various processes described 
immediately below, we cannot know for sure.  Based on the evidence we do have, it appears that 
tripartite lawmaking accounts for a significant proportion of these agreements, but is only one of 
several approaches through which the agreements are reached.  See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 7, 
at 835–40. 
  317  See supra note 89. 
  318  See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 90, at 144, 147. 
  319  See Brudney, supra note 7, at 837; Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 90, at 146.  
  320  See Eaton & Kriesky, supra note 90, at 146. 
  321  This Article does not attempt to develop a proposal for a relaxed preemption regime.  Al-
though such a project is beyond the scope here, other scholars have given this question some con-
sideration.  See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 3, at 1578–79 (suggesting a possible structure in which 
federal law acts as a “floor” below which states and localities may not go); Gottesman, supra note 
3, at 411–25.    
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effect of certain provisions of the NLRA,322 or, borrowing from federal 
employment laws like the Fair Labor Standards Act,323 refashion the 
federal organizing and bargaining provisions as “floors” below which 
states and cities cannot go but above which they may climb.324  Be-
cause a relaxed preemption regime, of whatever type, would enable 
state and local governments to intervene directly in the law of union 
organizing and bargaining, such a regime would make tripartite law-
making less necessary and likely less prevalent. 
To be sure, a relaxed preemption regime might not eliminate all in-
stances of tripartite labor lawmaking.  Given the right balance of polit-
ical power in a local jurisdiction, unions might be able to achieve de-
sired departures from the NLRA rules only through tripartite 
arrangements even absent a rule of federal preemption.  For example, 
a union might lack the political power necessary to convince a city 
council to enact a citywide card check ordinance, but the union might 
have political power sufficient to convince the city council to tie ap-
proval of an employer’s development plans to a private agreement on 
card check.  Given this particular balance of political power, certain 
instances of tripartite lawmaking might continue even absent federal 
labor preemption.  Nonetheless, tripartite lawmaking would likely sur-
vive only in jurisdictions where this particular balance of power ob-
tains, and would not continue in jurisdictions where labor has suffi-
cient power to seek labor law reform directly.  Accordingly, while no 
approach promises to eliminate tripartite lawmaking entirely, relaxing 
the preemption regime would reduce the prevalence of tripartism. 
This conclusion does not necessarily imply that relaxing the 
NLRA’s preemption doctrine is the right course for labor law.  Indeed, 
preemption reform of this kind would implicate all the costs and bene-
fits traditionally associated with federal preemption.  Among the bene-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  322  There would be precedent for such a move.  In 1947, Congress amended the Act to allow 
states to pass so-called right-to-work laws, which make union-shop agreements — permissible 
under section 8(a)(3) of the federal law — illegal.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 164(b) (2006). 
  323  Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).  The Fair 
Labor Standards Act, for example, establishes a federal minimum wage.  Id. § 206.  Under the 
statute, states and cities may enact minimum wages that exceed the one set by federal law, but 
they may not enact a minimum wage lower than the federal standard.  Id. § 218(a). 
  324  See Estlund, supra note 3, at 1578–79.  There is a difficulty inherent in construing the 
NLRA’s organizing and bargaining provisions as a floor.  Unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act’s 
minimum wage, for example, the NLRA’s organizing and bargaining rules assign rights to both 
labor and management, and they provide employees with both the right to engage in certain ac-
tivities (for example, union organizing activity) and the right to refrain from such activity.  See, 
e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees the right both to join labor organizations and to refrain 
from joining labor organizations); id. § 158 (detailing unfair labor practices for both unions and 
employers and establishing bargaining obligations for both unions and employers).  With statutory 
rights in tension in this manner, Congress would have to be relatively specific about which rights 
constitute the floor and which do not.    
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fits of relaxing or eliminating the NLRA’s preemption regime would be 
the potential for more genuine and productive experimental learning 
than is possible under the current rules.325  And given the multiple pa-
thologies of the current federal regime, the potential benefits of this 
type of reform are apparent.326  With less preemption, we might also 
expect greater and more direct political participation in local politics, 
along with the ability to satisfy a greater diversity of preferences — 
here, preferences of employees, employers, and unions — for various 
labor law rules.327  On the other hand, with a less robust preemption 
regime and wide variation in the rules of union organizing and bar-
gaining, it might be more costly for corporations to operate in multiple 
jurisdictions.328  Moreover, with a less robust preemption regime, some  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  325  See, e.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 252, at 287–88; Listokin, supra note 252, at 551–52. 
  326  In addition to enabling direct experimentation with the types of reform tripartism currently 
allows, see section IV.B, pp. 1199–1202, a less restrictive preemption regime would allow states 
and cities to experiment with the forms of labor-management cooperation and nonunion 
workplace committees that the federal Act prohibits, and would thereby permit firms to adopt the 
types of flexible work organization that the NLRA is rightly condemned for impeding.  See Ba-
renberg, supra note 12, at 879–93 (discussing flexible work organizations).  Localities might also 
help mitigate the vitriol that attends many NLRB organizing campaigns by abandoning the 
NLRA rule that precludes unions and management from discussing the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement prior to the completion of an organizing drive.  See Samuel Estreicher, Free-
dom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening Up the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 
71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834–36 (1996); Sachs, supra note 23, at 2694 n.28.  As Drummonds points 
out, local variation could facilitate productive experiments in the area of “minority” or “non-
exclusive” unionization.  See Drummonds, supra note 3, at 189–91.  See generally Paul M. Secun-
da, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address Workplace Captive Audience Meet-
ings in the United States, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 209 (2008) (discussing the need for state-
based legislation to ban captive audience meetings). 
  327  See, e.g., Young, supra note 252, at 53–58.  Professor Roderick Hills suggests a salutary lo-
cal-federal feedback effect that a relaxed preemption regime might generate and that would hold 
promise in the labor context.  Hills notes that the federal government, because of the size and het-
erogeneity of the population it encompasses, can suffer political gridlock.  Hills, supra note 251, at 
12.  Hills argues that a presumption against federal preemption can serve as a partial antidote to 
gridlock: if states and cities are free to regulate business interests, those interests will have both 
the incentive and the institutional resources to demand congressional response.  See id. at 17.  If 
Hills is correct, relaxing the labor preemption regime might be a partial antidote for the gridlock 
that has stymied federal labor law reform.  If states were to, for example, mandate card check 
recognition or — on the other hand — erect higher barriers to unionization, Congress might final-
ly be jarred to amend the federal law. 
   It is worth noting that Hills’s argument may extend descriptively, but not normatively, to 
our context.  He argues that gridlock is not always a problem, and that we should be concerned 
about gridlock only when “Congress maintains the status quo despite the existence of latent inter-
est groups that would, if mobilized, induce Congress to change the status quo for an outcome 
closer to that preferred by the public.”  Id. at 18.  It would be difficult to describe either labor or 
business as a “latent interest group[],” id.; indeed, both are already quite clearly mobilized around 
labor law reform.  See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 12, at 670 n.48.  Thus, although state and local in-
novation in labor law might prompt a congressional response, it is not clear that Hills would view 
the status quo as problematic. 
  328  But see Silverstein, supra note 251, at 33–43.    
1220  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 124:1153 
state and local jurisdictions would likely use labor law as a mechanism 
to attract business, potentially initiating the kind of race to the bottom 
in labor-protective legislation that Cox himself feared.329 
In sum, relaxing the preemption rules appears more likely to reduce 
the prevalence of tripartism than does a more robust preemption   
regime.  Whether this conclusion implies that a relaxation of the rules 
of preemption is the appropriate course for labor reform, however, de-
pends on independent judgments about the relative benefits of unifor-
mity and variation themselves — judgments that are beyond the scope 
of this Article — and a subsequent assessment of how those benefits 
should be balanced against the costs of tripartism that this Article has 
described. 
VI.  TRIPARTISM IN OTHER AREAS OF LAW 
Although this Article has focused on labor preemption and labor 
lawmaking, the analysis here suggests that the potential for tripartism 
extends beyond labor and across multiple areas of law.  In fact, the 
dynamics necessary for tripartite lawmaking are common.  In jurisdic-
tions where local governments have regulatory leverage over firms, 
and where interest groups — of whatever variety — have local politi-
cal power, the government’s regulatory leverage can be exchanged for 
firms’ compliance with the private demands of the interest groups.  Al-
though a full empirical investigation into these other contexts is 
beyond the scope of this Article, the literature already suggests several 
nonlabor iterations of tripartite lawmaking. 
In the environmental context, for example, firms have begun to en-
ter into “Good Neighbor Agreements” with community groups.330  
These agreements are private contracts through which firms agree to 
actions like reducing their emissions below federally mandated levels,  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  329  Cox wrote that a national labor policy, to be achieved through federal preemption doctrine, 
was necessary to avoid “interstate competition in enacting statutes attractive to industry.”  Cox, 
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, supra note 39, at 1317.  A different possibility is that 
states and cities would use an expansive labor law to attract certain types of workers, thus creat-
ing a type of race to the top.  See Freeman & Rogers, supra note 298, at 219.  Economists Richard 
Freeman and Joel Rogers predict neither type of race, instead projecting that states would vary 
their laws on private sector unionization in approximate accordance with their public sector bar-
gaining laws.  See id. at 215, 219.  Freeman and Rogers estimate that states hostile to labor would 
enact laws that would reduce union membership by approximately half a million members, while 
states friendly to labor would enact laws that would grow union ranks by approximately four mil-
lion members — leading to a net addition of 3.5 million union members.  Id. 
  330  See, e.g., Sanford Lewis & Diane Henkels, Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool for Environ-
mental and Social Justice, SOC. JUST., Winter 1996, at 134; Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Envi-
ronmental Justice: Turning Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 171–72 (2002); Vandenbergh, supra note 237, at 2064–66.    
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subsidizing local health facilities, providing information to the com-
munity, and allowing community monitoring of environmental com-
pliance.331  As environmental scholars have noted, moreover, commu-
nity groups can secure such agreements by intervening in local 
political processes.332 
Of course, federal environmental law also preempts certain forms 
of state and local environmental legislation.  Federal statutes, for ex-
ample, set standards for pesticide presence in foods, and states are 
precluded from imposing more stringent requirements than those set 
out in the federal law.333  So, should a state or city wish to set more 
exacting standards for pesticide content in foods, it would be pro-
hibited from doing so directly.  Assume, though, that an agricultural 
firm doing business in a given state and county wants a certain area 
rezoned for agricultural purposes, or needs a permit to expand opera-
tions, or wants the state tax code amended in some way, or has any 
number of other interests that are impacted by state and local gov-
ernment action.  Now assume that there is an environmental organiza-
tion that wants to increase the stringency of pesticide standards for 
foods.  The organization lacks the ability to convince the agricultural 
firm to agree to heightened standards on its own, but the organization 
has significant political sway in the county council or state legislature.  
Good Neighbor Agreements — like private organizing agreements — 
present the possibility for a tripartite political exchange: the state or 
county could act in the nonenvironmental area of law in exchange for 
the agricultural firm’s private agreement to abide by more stringent 
pesticide standards.  As in the labor context then, tripartite lawmaking 
would enable a local departure from the formally preemptive federal 
environmental regime. 
 Community  Benefits  Agreements,  or CBAs, provide another exam-
ple.  CBAs are instruments through which community groups secure 
commitments from developers to provide a range of public goods.334  
Like Good Neighbor Agreements, many CBAs take the form of a pri-
vate contract between the community group and a developer, spelling  
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  331  See Vandenbergh, supra note 237, at 2064. 
  332  Janet Siegel writes that one means through which a community organization can secure a 
Good Neighbor Agreement is “to intervene in a permitting process or permit renewal process.”  
Siegel, supra note 330, at 174; see also Vandenbergh, supra note 237, at 2066 (“The agreements 
enable firms to head off community opposition to facility operations or pressure for government 
regulatory measures by agreeing to private standards and oversight.”). 
  333  See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 632–33 (2001). 
  334  See, e.g., Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal En-
forceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 46–47 (2008); Schragger, 
supra note 105, at 509–12.    
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out the types of community benefits the developer has committed to 
provide — ranging from low-income housing, to jobs programs, to re-
settlement assistance  — as a component of its overall development 
project.335  And, again, developers often commit to provide these bene-
fits because doing so secures the community group’s political support 
and, in turn, the requisite zoning and permitting approvals from the 
local government.336  Accordingly, CBAs present another context in 
which tripartite political exchanges can be used to avert the formally 
preemptive effect of a broad range of federal laws.  Practitioners in the 
CBA field recognize this fact.  As one leading CBA attorney writes: 
“Although the public approval process provides the backdrop for nego-
tiation of a private CBA, these purely private agreements are not sub-
ject to the wide range of legal strictures on governmental action.  Thus 
the substance of a private CBA is not restricted by  .  .  .  statutory 
preemption concerns . . . .”337 
Indeed, CBAs can impose a host of standards on developers that 
federal preemption law would prohibit states and cities from imposing 
directly.  In addition to setting labor and environmental standards,338 
CBAs also might be used, for example, to impose health care require-
ments the direct imposition of which would be preempted by   
ERISA,339 or immigration standards which, if imposed through direct 
local legislation, would be preempted by federal immigration law.340  
In short, where federal preemption coexists with the possibility for 
private ordering, the potential for tripartite lawmaking will exist   
as well.  And, as this Article has shown, the possibility for tripartite 
lawmaking presents a significant challenge to preemption law: what-
ever the specific federal regime, courts will struggle to find state and 
local government action preempted when that government action 




  335  See Gross, supra note 334, at 46. 
  336  See Schragger, supra note 105, at 509 (observing that CBAs can be secured “[i]n exchange 
for community political support”); see also Gross, supra note 334, at 46 (noting that, in exchange 
for the developer’s commitment to provide community benefits, “the community groups agree to 
support the project through the approval process, to refrain from lobbying against it, and/or to 
release legal claims regarding the project”). 
  337  Gross, supra note 334, at 46. 
  338  For a list of examples of Community Benefits Agreements and the conditions they require, 
see  Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs), THE  P’SHIP  FOR  WORKING  FAMILIES, http:// 
communitybenefits.org/section.php?id=155 (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). 
  339  See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,  190 ( 4th Cir. 2007) (noting the 
broad reach of ERISA preemption). 
  340  See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 518–20 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in 
relevant part, 620 F.3d 170, 202 (3d Cir. 2010).    
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The normative implications described in Part IV will also follow 
tripartite lawmaking into these other legal contexts.  Thus, the varia-
tion that tripartite lawmaking permits will present opportunities for 
experimentalism, even in areas of law where the federal regime intends 
to foreclose state and local variation.  But the form of experimentalism 
will be limited, both by the private nature of the tripartite agreements 
and by the asymmetric political valence that tripartism will exhibit.341  
Moreover, the problems with opacity, elusion of legal review, political 
indirection, and collateral effects on other areas of law follow from the 
structure of tripartite lawmaking, and they will be attendant on tri-
partism irrespective of the specific subject matter of the tripartite 
agreement.  Accordingly, the normative assessment of tripartism in 
these other contexts, and thus the appropriate response to it, will de-
pend — as it does in the labor context — on an overall assessment of 
the relative desirability of variation and uniformity, along with an 
evaluation of the costs that come with this form of lawmaking. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has described the ways in which the rules of union or-
ganizing and bargaining can be reshaped in states and cities despite 
the exceptional breadth of the federal labor preemption regime.   
Through a tripartite political process, the public acts of local govern-
ments are exchanged, in one manner or another, for private union-
employer agreements on a redesigned set of organizing and bargaining 
rules.  Identifying and describing this form of labor lawmaking pro-
vides a more accurate and a more complete picture of the role of the 
local in U.S. labor law. 
The form of tripartite lawmaking identified here also allows for a 
new, and fuller, assessment of the preemption regime itself.  That is, 
although the NLRA’s preemption doctrine is among the broadest and 
most robust in federal law, political exchanges and private ordering  
allow for circumventions of that doctrine.  By operating under the   
radar of preemption analysis, tripartism allows for forms of local vari-
ation that preemption doctrine intends to, and is understood to, fore-
close.  This variation, in itself, is significant.  But so too are the legal 
and political processes through which such variation is achieved and,  




  341  These dynamics will not be precisely the same across contexts.  For example, if there are 
community or advocacy groups over which local jurisdictions have significant regulatory leverage, 
the asymmetry in political valence might be less severe than in the labor context.    
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Finally, because the political conditions that facilitate tripartism are 
fairly common, the dynamics identified here have significance across 
multiple areas of law.  Where state and local governments possess reg-
ulatory authority over firms, and organized interest groups enjoy polit-
ical power in those state and local jurisdictions, the kind of tripartite 
exchanges described in this Article are possible.  As this Article has 
shown, the possibility for this kind of political exchange raises impor-
tant questions about, and poses challenges for, preemption law — both 
within the labor context and beyond. 